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LOCAL RULES AND THE FALSE VALUE OF  
TRANS-TERRITORIAL PROCEDURE 
 
Samuel P. Jordan 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Local rules have been unfairly cast as procedural villains.  Their 
qualifications for the role are purportedly numerous, but chief among 
them is that they violate a fundamental principle embedded in our post-
1938 procedural regime:  that the procedural rules applied in a federal 
case should not be sensitive to location.  It must of course be conceded 
that local rules do produce territorial variations in procedure.  But in 
practice, the principle of trans-territoriality is aspirational, and is 
undermined by an array of factors - ranging from competing 
interpretations of written rules to the supplementation of those rules 
through exercises of inherent power - that inevitably contribute to 
location-based variations in the actual procedural requirements imposed 
in federal cases.  Properly situated, local rules are not an outlier, but are 
merely one form of territorial variation among many.  To assess local 
rules, therefore, we should not ask whether they produce territorial 
variation, but instead whether a procedural regime that permits them 
produces a better mix of territorial variation than one that does not.  
When viewed this way, local rules emerge as attractive - if not quite 
heroic - because they are transparent, they reflect participation by non-
judicial actors, and they promote intra-district equality in the treatment 
of cases. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 On January 13, 2010, the Supreme Court stayed the 
broadcast of a pending federal trial that will decide the 
constitutionality of California’s Proposition 8.1  In doing so, the 
Court took great pains to avoid discussing the underlying merits of 
either the case or the question whether federal trials should be 
broadcast.2  Instead, the stay was justified on fairly technical 
grounds:  that the local rule used to support the broadcast order 
was invalid because it had been improperly amended.3  This 
marked only the fourth time since the introduction of the federal 
rules in 1938 that the Supreme Court has addressed local rules and 
local rulemaking authority.4  While much of the majority opinion 
focused narrowly on the details surrounding the promulgation of 
the particular rule in question,5 the opinion also bemoaned the 
“lack of a regular rule with proper standards.”6   
                                                          
1
 Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. ___ (2010).  It would perhaps be more 
accurate to say that the pending federal trial will temporarily decide the 
constitutionality of Proposition 8.  Regardless of the trial outcome, the case will 
certainly be appealed and is indeed being structured - by the litigants and the 
district judge alike - for eventual Supreme Court review.  See Margaret Talbot, 
A Risky Proposal, THE NEW YORKER, Jan. 18, 2010 (describing the litigation 
strategy and the likelihood for eventual Supreme Court review); William C. 
Duncan, The Proposition 8 Trial: Understanding the Evidence, THE AMERICAN 
SPECTATOR, Mar. 3. 2010 (arguing that the decision to seek - and permit - 
broadcast was “probably driven by the ultimate goal of the case - a hearing 
before the U.S. Supreme Court”). 
2
 Id. at *7 (“We do not here express any views on the propriety of broadcasting 
court proceedings more generally.”). 
3
 Id.  Because the issue was decided in the context of an application for a stay, 
the Court’s opinion formally concluded that the amendment “likely did not” 
comply with federal law.  But the remaining language of the opinion is not 
similarly restrained.  See, e.g., id. at *14 (The District Court here attempted to 
revise its rules in haste, contrary to federal statutes and the policy of the Judicial 
Conference of the United States.”); id. at *16-17 (“If courts are to require that 
others follow regular procedures, courts must do so as well.”). 
4
 The three others are Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641 (1987); Wingo v. 
Wedding, 418 U.S. 461 (1974); and Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973).  
As Justice Breyer argued in dissent, the reason for the paucity of Supreme Court 
cases involving local rules may be due to an appropriate deference to the Circuit 
Judicial Councils in monitoring and policing local judicial administration.  
Hollingsworth, 558 U.S. __ (Breyer, J., dissenting).   
5
 Specifically, the primary emphasis is on a rather convoluted timeline of 
amendments and proposed amendments, id. at *3-6, and on whether the notice 
and comment period associated with those amendments satisfied statutory 
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 This latter concern is not limited to the amendment 
procedures, but is directed at local rules themselves.  Thus, the 
case may reflect some unease with the status of local rules in the 
federal system.  If so, the Supreme Court is late to the party.  
Hostility toward local rules is as old as the federal rules 
themselves.  Over the past seventy years, a steady stream of 
commentators and committees has recommended that the role of 
local rules in the federal procedural structure be reduced or 
eliminated.  The core complaint behind these recommendations is 
that local rules are a source of procedural disuniformity.  As Part I 
explains, the adoption of a federal system of procedural rules 
reflected an embrace of two forms of procedural uniformity:  trans-
territoriality and trans-substantivity.7  Trans-territorial procedure 
requires the application of the same procedural rules regardless of 
geography; trans-substantive procedure requires the application of 
the same procedural rules regardless of substantive law.  Local 
rules are potentially in tension with the norm of trans-substantivity 
if they are used to impose different procedural requirements for 
different types of cases.8  But as discussed in Part II, the larger 
problem with local rules is that they are almost unavoidably in 
tension with the norm of trans-territoriality.  Local rules create 
variations in procedural requirements precisely on the basis of 
geography, and for that reason they have long been viewed as 
fundamentally inconsistent with the federal rules regime. 
                                                                                                                                  
requirements, id. at *10-12 (concluding no), see also  id. at *1-5 (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (concluding yes). 
6
 Id. at *14.   
7
 A brief note about nomenclature.  The use of the label “trans-substantivity” to 
describe the idea that the same federal rules should apply regardless of the 
nature of the suit is well-accepted, and may be traced to Robert Cover.  Robert 
M. Cover, For Wm. James Moore: Some Reflections on a Reading of the Rules , 
84 YALE L. J. 718 (1975).  But no similarly accepted phrase describes the 
parallel idea that the same federal rules should apply regardless of the location 
of the suit.  Professor Rubenstein has referred to this idea as “trans-venue 
uniformity.”  See William B. Rubenstein, The Concept of Equality in Civil 
Procedure, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1865, 1885 n.75 (2002).  I choose trans-
territoriality instead, in part to avoid any unnecessary confusion with the concept 
of venue, but primarily because it more closely resembles trans-substantivity in 
form. 
8
 Then again, local rules of this sort would potentially be invalid.  FED. R. CIV. P. 
83(a) requires local rules to be consistent with federal rules, see infra Part II.A, 
and the norm of trans-substantivity derives at least in spirit from Rule 1, which 
dictates that the rules apply to “all civil actions and proceedings in the United 
States district courts.” See Cover, supra note 7, at 1886. 
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 To this point, the defense of local rules has been sporadic 
and largely uninspired.  One recurrent argument is that some 
rulemaking authority is necessary to deal with issues that are 
inescapably local.9  At its best, this is a narrow argument that stops 
well short of defending the current scope of local rulemaking 
power.  Defenders of local rules have also tended to argue that 
critics improperly undervalue the benefits of disuniformity in 
general and local rules in particular.  Examples of the 
unappreciated benefits cited include the the potential for local rules 
to act as “experiments” leading to broader procedural reform,10 the 
                                                          
9
 Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules and State Rules: Uniformity, 
Divergence, and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 2047 
(1989) [hereinafter Subrin, Federal Rules] (“[Critics] argue that local rules 
permit adjustment to local conditions . . . .”); Gregory C. Sisk, The 
Balkanization of Appellate Justice: The Proliferation of Local Rules in the 
Federal Circuits, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 35-38 (1997) (identifying rules related 
to the size of the court (e.g., rules related to the number of copies of motions that 
must be filed) and rules related to case management based on court caseload as  
matters of genuinely local concern that should be subject to regulation by local 
circuit rules); Robert E. Keeton, The Function of Local Rules and the Tension 
with Uniformity, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 853, 861-62 (1989) (“[I]t is bad to have 
nationally uniform rules that sweep so broadly in precluding local variation that 
they outlaw sensible adaptations to the kinds of problems that are more common 
in the mix of cases on a particular local docket than in the national mix.”); Carl 
Tobias, Local Federal Civil Procedure for the Twenty-First Century, 77 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 533, 569 (2002) (noting that many local rules were passed to 
address “peculiar, problematic local conditions, which the federal rules 
frequently ignored”); Edward D. Cavanagh, The Civil Justice Reform Act of 
1990 and the 1993 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Can 
Systemic Ills Afflicting the Federal Courts be Remedied By Local Rules?, 67  ST. 
JOHN’S L. REV. 721, 731 (1993) (“By and large, the rules governing these 
matters turn on local custom. Because the need for nationwide uniformity is low, 
perhaps even non-existent, local rules adequately serve their gap-filling 
function.”). 
10
 Subrin, Federal Rules, supra note 9, at 2017 (discussing the Knox 
Committee’s predictions that local rules would have great experimentation value 
because they would likely prove helpful in suggesting future amendments to the 
Federal Rules); Tobias, Local Federal Civil Procedure, supra note 9, at 569 
(describing the use of local rules as a means of experimenting with “innovative 
procedures for resolving litigation, especially mechanisms that promised to 
foster economical, prompt dispute disposition”); Steven Flanders, Local Rules in 
Federal District Courts: Usurpation, Legislation or Information?, 14 LOY. L.A. 
L. REV. 213, 219 (1981) (“Local rules . . . alert rulemakers to the need for 
changes in national rules and provide an empirical basis for making changes.”); 
Keeton, supra note 9, at 859 (noting that the very purpose of a national rule may 
be to generate and legitimize local experimentation). 
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lower barriers to local procedural change,11 and assistance with 
vital court administration functions.12  The suggested conclusion is 
that, if properly understood, these countervailing benefits may in 
some instances justify a departure from the ideal of uniform 
procedure.13 These arguments are useful because the identified 
benefits are real, but they remain susceptible to the response that 
the cost of deviating from the norm of trans-territoriality remains 
too great.   
 This article develops a more robust defense of local rules, 
one that is rooted in an acknowledgement that deviations from the 
norm of trans-territoriality are unavoidable and unrelated to the 
choice to permit local rules.  Trans-territoriality has achieved a 
status as a fundamental procedural value, but Part III demonstrates 
that that value is largely aspirational in practice.  The actual 
procedural requirements imposed on litigants are inevitably 
sensitive to the location of the suit - and the identity of the judge - 
and the sources of territorial variation include not just local rules, 
but standing orders, procedural interpretation, procedural 
discretion, inherent authority and procedural common law.  
Moreover, these forms of territorial variation often substitute for 
                                                          
11
 See A SELF-STUDY OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL  RULEMAKING: A REPORT FROM THE 
SUBCOMMITTEE  ON  LONG  RANGE  PLANNING  TO  THE  COMMITTEE  ON  RULES  
OF  PRACTICE, PROCEDURE  AND  EVIDENCE  OF  THE  JUDICIAL  CONFERENCE  OF  
THE  UNITED  STATES, 168  F.R.D. 679, 707-08 (1995) (describing recent 
changes that have resulted in slower reform of the Federal Rules, including the 
increased opportunities for comment, increased length of report-and-wait 
periods, and the frenetic process resulting from the allowance of multiple 
proposed rule changes pending simultaneously).  “It takes too long to amend a 
rule or create a new one, and delay not only perpetuates whatever problem 
occasioned the call for amendment but also invites congress and local courts to 
step in.”  Id. 
12
 Subrin, Federal Rules, supra note 9, at 2017-19 (discussing how local rules 
can help the court manage routine tasks); Flanders, supra note 10, at 263, 268 
(discussing the vital role of local rules in assisting local courts’ efforts to 
manage themselves and their dockets and describing local rules as a “ powerful 
tool for rationalizing diverse court practices and imposing uniformity”); 
Coquillette, Squiers & Subrin, The Role of Local Rules, 75-Jan. A.B.A.J. 62, 64-
65(1989) (observing that local rules can rid courts of certain routine tasks and 
can assist busy trial judges by providing them with more specificity on how to 
handle daily problems for which there is not a federal rule on point). 
13
 A related - but essentially unused - defense of local rules is that the value of 
territorial uniformity is itself overvalued.  Amanda Frost has recently made this 
argument in the context of federal substantive law, Overvaluing Uniformity, 94 
VA. L. REV. 1567 (2008), and the argument applies equally well (if not better) to 
federal procedural law. 
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one another, such that the presence of a local rule may displace the 
use of some competing form.   
 Thus, the debate about local rules needs to be resituated 
within the larger universe of territorial variation, and Part IV 
begins that process.  The choice to permit local rules is not a 
choice to permit territorial variation, but a choice to permit 
territorial variation of a certain form.  And the question of whether 
to retain local rules, and in what capacity, turns on how local rules 
interact with and compare to other forms of territorial variation.  
Relative to those other forms, local rules emerge as preferable 
along several dimensions.  They are transparent in the sense that 
they are visible, easily discoverable, and knowable in advance.  
They are participatory in the sense that non-judicial actors are 
guaranteed a role in their creation.  And they are stabilizing in the 
sense that they make the actual - as opposed to the formal - 
procedural requirements imposed within a judicial district more 
consistent.   
 
I.     TRANS-TERRITORIALITY AS A PROCEDURAL VALUE 
 
Trans-territoriality, which involves the application of the 
same procedural rules regardless of the geographic location of the 
suit, was one of the guiding values in the creation of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure.14 Now, some seventy years after that 
                                                          
14
 It certainly was not the only guiding value, see Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity 
Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical 
Context, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 982 (1987) [hereinafter Subrin, How Equity 
Conquered Common Law] (discussing how the rule-makers created equity-based 
Federal Rules to permit “the participation of virtually unlimited numbers of 
people in trials” and “escape the confinement of the common law”); Brooke D. 
Coleman, Recovering Access: Rethinking the Structure of Federal Civil 
Rulemaking, 39 N.M. L. REV. 261, 263-64 (2009) (“access” – meaning the 
expulsion of procedural barriers from the opportunity to reach the merits of a 
case – was an explicit target of the rule-makers). 
 There is an interesting and important connection between the 
procedural value of trans-territoriality and the doctrine associated with Erie 
Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), which instructs federal courts sitting 
in diversity to apply federal procedural laws.  This, too, was designed in part to 
promote federal uniformity - and to discourage variations created by the need to 
follow local rules.  See, e.g., Lumberman’s Mut. Cas. Co. v. Wright, 322 F.2d 
759, 764 (5th Cir. 1963) (“One of the shaping purposes of the Federal Rules [of 
Civil Procedure] is to bring about uniformity in the federal courts by getting 
away from local rules.”); Rubenstein, supra note 7, at 1888.  Indeed, the reason 
cited by the Supreme Court for granting review in Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 
460, 463 (1965), was a “threat to the goal of uniformity of federal procedure.”   
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creation, it is now firmly entrenched and rarely questioned.  Civil 
procedure students learn very early that the primary source to be 
studied is the body of procedural rules that apply in every federal 
court, but that state procedural rules may – and often do – vary.  
The idea that procedure tracks the level of the court rather than its 
location is accepted, and indeed seems obvious.  But it is worth 
remembering that trans-territoriality was an innovation, and a 
contested one.15  This Part defines what is meant by trans-
territoriality, and describes why it was - and continues to be - 
perceived as valuable. 
 
A. From Conformity to Uniformity 
 
The introduction of the federal rules marked a departure 
from the prevailing stance of conformity to state procedural rules 
and an embrace of a competing stance of uniformity among all 
federal districts.  The conformity regime was governed by the 
Conformity Act of 1872, although cruder forms of conformity had 
been in place since 1789.16  Under the Conformity Act, federal 
courts were required, subject to caveats discussed shortly, to apply 
the “practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding” of 
the states where they sat.17  This predictably resulted in a 
balkanized set of federal procedural rules that broke down along 
state lines, and therefore generated what at first blush looks like the 
                                                                                                                                  
Thus, the allure of uniform federal procedure has generated hostility over time 
toward local variations of any kind, whether the result of federally-created local 
rules or an obligation to enforce state-created procedural rules.  
15
 The account presented here is brief and somewhat stylized.  For a more 
thorough history of events leading up to the passage of the Rules Enabling Act, 
see generally Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1015 (1982); Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law, supra note 
14. 
16
 See Burbank, supra note 15, at 1037.  This cruder form required federal courts 
to use the “forms of writs, executions or other process” that were the “same as 
now used in . . . [state] courts respectively in pursuance of the [original 
Conformity Act of 1789].”  Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 36, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276.  
Unfortunately, that language was interpreted to define the applicable federal 
procedure as the state procedure that existed in 1789, with the result that 
subsequent modifications to state procedural rules were simply ignored.  See 
Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, (1825).  Professor Burbank has 
referred to this 1792 version of conformity as “static,” and the 1872 version that 
replaced it as “dynamic.”  See also Burbank, supra note 15, at 1037-40. 
17
 Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, §§ 5 & 6, 17 Stat. 196, 197.  As with the earlier 
forms of the conformity acts, equity and admiralty cases were excluded.   
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exact opposite of uniformity.18  But in fact, the conformity regime 
was designed to promote rather than destroy uniformity, although 
the particular uniformity that was envisioned was intrastate rather 
than interdistrict.19  That is, conformity had as its goal the creation 
of a single set of procedural rules that would apply within a given 
state, regardless of whether a given case were filed in federal or 
state court.  
One problem with the conformity regime was that it did not 
serve its vision of uniformity particularly well.  In part this was 
due to incomplete coverage.  The Act applied only in the common 
law context, so that federal equity cases were governed by a 
different set of procedures – defined by federal common law and 
the Supreme Court, by way of their supervisory power – than state 
equity cases.20  In part it was due to the less-than-ironclad 
requirements even within the scope of coverage.  The Act required 
only that federal courts approximate state procedures “as near as 
may be” and in “like causes,”21 and this left sufficient wiggle room 
for courts to deviate from true conformity and create variations on 
state procedures that confused and frustrated the bar.22  In the end, 
                                                          
18
 Indeed, in some respects the Conformity Act regime was even worse because 
it also created balkanization between procedure in federal common law cases, 
which were governed by the Conformity Acts, and procedure in federal equity 
and admiralty cases, which were governed by the Supreme Court’s rulemaking 
authority. 
19
 See Nudd v. Burrows, 91 U.S. 426, 441 (1875) (explaining that the purpose of 
the Conformity Act was “to bring about uniformity in the law of procedure in 
the federal and state courts of the same locality”); Z. W. Julius Chen, Note, 
Following the Leader: Twombly, Pleading Standards, and Procedural 
Uniformity, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1431, 1464 (2008) (“The primary goal from 
the time of the original Conformity Act was to spare the bench and bar from 
having to work within two procedural systems.”); Mary Margaret Penrose and 
Dace A. Caldwell, A Short and Plain Solution to the Medical Malpractice 
Crisis: Why Charles E. Clark Remains Prophetically Correct About Special 
Pleading and the Big Case, 39 GA. L. REV. 971, 1004 (2005) (“The purpose of 
the Conformity Act was to provide a uniform procedure for all courts in the 
same state.”). 
20
 See Burbank, supra note 15, at 1039; David L. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A 
Look at the Theory and Practice of Rulemaking, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1969, 1974 
(1989) (recognizing the lack of uniformity between federal and state courts 
within a single state even under the conformity regime). The Conformity Act 
also did not apply to admiralty cases. But this did not have the effect of creating 
disuniformity because the admiralty jurisdiction is exclusive. 
21
 Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, §§ 5 & 6, 17 Stat. 196, 197.  
22
 See Burbank, supra note 15, at 1041 (concluding that the Conformity Act 
“afforded numerous opportunities for federal courts to decline conformity to 
state law”).  
  
TRANS-TERRITORIAL PROCEDURE 
 
   
 
10 
 
despite the goal of creating a uniform set of procedures applicable 
within a state, the result under the Conformity Act was the creation 
of a jumbled and complex procedural mess.23 
Another more significant problem with the conformity 
regime was that its premise – its vision of uniformity – came under 
attack at the turn of the twentieth century.  The complete story is a 
long one involving many characters, but a key figure for present 
purposes is Thomas W. Shelton, who in 1911 introduced the 
resolution that eventually led to the introduction of the rules and 
who chaired the initial 1912 ABA Committee on Uniform Judicial 
Procedure.24  Perhaps more than anyone else, Shelton is 
responsible for making national uniformity – as opposed to intra-
state uniformity – the prevailing procedural vision.  In doing so, 
Shelton ran headlong into Senator Thomas J. Walsh, who 
staunchly defended the conformity regime until his death in 1933.  
The battle between Shelton and Walsh was in large measure a 
battle between competing visions of uniformity.  Shelton 
prioritized uniformity across the federal system, although he also 
assumed that intrastate uniformity would follow because states 
would willingly follow the federal example.25  Walsh, on the other 
hand, was deeply suspicious of that assumption, and feared that the 
real effect of uniform federal rules would be to create 
disuniformity between the state and federal courts.  Walsh viewed 
true national uniformity as a practical impossibility, and would 
have selected to maintain intrastate uniformity as the most 
practical approach for the majority of practicing lawyers.26 
                                                          
23
 See 19 A.B.A. Report 411, 420 (1896) (suggesting that a federal practitioner, 
“even in his own state, feels no more certainty as to the proper procedure than if 
he were before a tribunal of a foreign country”); Burbank, supra note 15, at 
1041-42 (“[T]he potential complexity of an action drawing on so many sources 
of procedural law made the practitioner’s job difficult”). 
24
 See Burbank, supra note 15, at 1049 (“Shelton argued that uniformity of 
procedure was essential, along with uniformity of interpretation, to the goal of 
uniformity of law” and “saw a federal model, prepared by the Supreme Court, as 
the best hope for national uniformity”).  
25
 See Stephen N. Subrin, The New Era in American Civil Procedure, 67 A.B.A. 
J. 1648, 1650 (1981) (Proponents retorted that the uniform federal rules would 
be a model adopted by the states.”); Charles E. Clark & James W. Moore,, A 
New Federal Civil Procedure, 44 YALE L.J. 387, 387 (1935) (recognizing 
“unusual opportunity” for “developing a procedure which may properly be a 
model to all the states”); S. Rep. No. 64-892, pt. 1, at 21 (1917) (stating that 
both convenience and merit would lead to state adoption). 
26
 See Simplification of Judicial Procedure: Hearings Pursuant to S. Res. 552 
Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 64th Cong., 1st 
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 Of course, Shelton’s vision eventually carried the day,27 
helped by the death of Walsh and the ascent of Homer Cummings 
as Attorney General.28  Uniformity across all federal districts 
became the aspirational standard with the passage of the Rules 
Enabling Act of 1934, and was formally achieved with the 
promulgation of Rule 1, which specified that the rules were to 
apply “in the district courts of the United States.”29 But while it is 
accurate to say that the federal rules reflect the triumph of federal 
trans-territoriality over intrastate conformity, that does not go far 
enough.  More must be said about precisely why trans-territoriality 
became so valued.30  Trans-territoriality triumphed because it was 
a means to desired ends, and it is to those ends that we now turn. 
 
B. The Ends of Trans-territoriality 
 
Over time, proponents of trans-territoriality have identified 
a variety of benefits associated with geographic procedural 
uniformity in the federal system.  The primary original benefits 
were the facilitation of national legal practice the promotion of 
nationalized commerce.  Later, benefits sounding in equality and 
efficiency were emphasized:  uniform procedure can assist in 
generating like outcomes in like cases, and can do so with fewer 
resources being devoted to litigation and to the rulemaking 
process.  Each of these benefits is enhanced substantially if 
uniformity exists not just across federal districts, but between the 
federal and state systems.  Proponents of trans-territoriality 
identified this complete procedural uniformity as a separate end to 
be attained by the adoption of federal rules, and concluded that this 
end was not only possible but likely because state rulemakers 
would quickly and willingly mimic their federal counterparts. 
 
                                                                                                                                  
Sess. 28 (1915) [hereinafter 1915 Senate Hearings](describing himself as “for 
the one hundred who stay at home against the one who goes abroad”). 
27
 Although not until after Shelton himself had left the scene. 
28
 See Burbank, supra note 15, at 1095-96 (discussing Cummings’s role). 
29
 FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (1938).  In 1948, the Rule was amended slightly to “in the 
United States district courts.”  FED. R. CIV. P. 1.  See also Monarch Ins. Co. v. 
Spach, 281 F.2d 401, 408 (5th Cir. 1960) (“The broad aim [of the Rules 
Enabling Act], especially in fields of practice, was to reverse the philosophy of 
conformity to local state procedure and establish . . . an approach of uniformity 
within the whole federal judicial trial system.”). 
30
 See Stephen N. Subrin, supra note 9, at 2000 (quoting Connor Hall’s 
complaint that uniformity was too often presented “as if it were some excellence 
in itself”). 
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1. Nationalization 
 
The standardization of procedural rules across federal 
districts reflected a desire to promote, or at least to respond to, the 
nationalization of both commerce and legal practice.  With respect 
to commerce, proponents of procedural uniformity emphasized 
economic nationalization and the associated decline in the 
relevance of state borders as justifications for pursuing a body of 
procedure that could be applied without reference to geography.31  
Along those lines, Shelton urged uniformity in procedure as a 
predicate to the support of commerce because it “give[s] an 
assurance of interstate judicial relations as fixed, necessary and 
useful as fixed interstate commercial relations.”32   
The legal practice argument is related.  Shelton lamented 
that lawyers representing national corporations could not easily 
navigate the numerous federal courts in which cases might be 
brought because of the barriers created by the conformity regime.33  
To facilitate the national practice of law, then, it was necessary to 
remove those barriers and permit lawyers to cross state and district 
lines freely.  As David Shapiro has described it, the rules were 
designed to permit “lawyers who went into any federal court . . . to 
know what to expect and not to have to undergo an initiation 
                                                          
31
  Of course, this is connected to the idea that what we need is true universal 
uniformity because some cases involving commerce could not be brought in 
federal court.  See infra Part I.B.4.  There are also parallels here to arguments 
made in the domain of personal jurisdiction and choice of law during roughly 
the same period. Ellen E. Sward, Justification and Doctrinal Evolution, 37 
CONN. L. REV. 389, 453-54 (2004) (discussing how the creation of the minimum 
contacts test in International Shoe demonstrated the decreasing importance of 
state boundaries); William F. Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 
STAN. L. REV. 1, 1 (1963) (recognizing that choice of law doctrine was 
dramatically altered when “members of our society, in both their personal and 
business activities, increasingly disregard[ed] the existence of state 
boundaries”). 
32
 See Subrin, Federal Rules, supra note 9, at 2003 (quoting Shelton); see also 
Thomas W. Shelton, An American Common Law in the Making – The Habit of 
Thinking Uniformity, 30 LAW NOTES 50, 52 (1926) (arguing that ‘there is no 
more excuse for differing judicial procedure than for differing language in the 
several states’). 
33
 See Subrin, Federal Rules, supra note 9, at 2004-05 (quoting Shelton “these 
are what are called United States courts, but instead I call them New York City 
courts”); Burbank, supra note 15, at 1041 nn.111-12 (noting that lawyers face 
additional barriers resulting from judges applying “the common law or the code 
practice with their various modifications”). 
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period or to rely heavily on the wisdom of local practitioners.”34  A 
final argument blends the economic nationalization and legal 
profession concerns:  The complexity and unpredictability of the 
fragmented procedural system was leading many national 
corporations to pursue alternatives such as arbitration rather than 
litigation, and national rules would have the desirable effect of 
encouraging a return to the courtroom.35 
 
2. Equality and Fairness 
 
A second concern raised in the movement toward trans-
territoriality relates to equality and fairness.  Many proponents of 
federal rules worried that state procedural systems were inferior, 
and that the conformity regime operated in practice to bind federal 
courts to apply undesirable procedures.36  The inferiority of many 
state systems was attributed at least in part to the fact that most 
state procedural rules derived from a legislative process.  The 
introduction of a national process driven instead by dedicated 
rulemakers was expected to lead to the development of rules that 
were not just uniform, but also better.   
Even apart from any such qualitative improvements, the 
fact that the rules are applied uniformly across the federal system 
promotes two different forms of equality.  First, trans-territoriality 
contributes to an appearance of neutrality in the sense that all cases 
- and all litigants - are governed by the same set of rules.  These 
notions of equality and neutrality are admittedly quite formal, but 
even formal equality may enhance legitimacy and increase 
acceptance of the rules and the system of adjudication more 
generally.  Ultimately, though, trans-territorial procedure is 
connected to a more substantive notion of equality, one that 
                                                          
34
 Shapiro, supra note 21, at 2004-05; see also Coquillette, Squiers & Subrin, 
supra note 12, at 64 (arguing that the Federal Rules were designed to allow a 
lawyer admitted in one federal jurisdiction to easily practice in any other. 
35
 Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law, supra note 14, at 960 (noting 
the ability of non-litigation forums to apply clear, simple rules); Subrin, Federal 
Rules, supra note 9, at 2005 (arguing that uniform, simple rules – which 
encourage corporate participation in court forums – imply centralized 
rulemaking). 
36
 Burbank, supra note 15, at 1042 n.113.  At some level, federal courts could 
avoid this result even under the conformity regime by taking advantage of the 
wiggle room that existed in the Conformity Act.  See supra notes 22-23 and 
accompanying text.   
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emphasizes the similar treatment of similar cases.37 The 
conformity regime meant that parallel cases were often subject to 
substantially different procedures, and these procedural variations 
could often lead directly to variations in case outcomes.  The 
application of uniform procedural rules throughout the federal 
system promised to reduce such inequities.  Thus, the trans-
territoriality principle is intended not just to make the system 
neutral, but to make it fair.   
This latter version of equality was implicit in the 
nationalization argument, although it was not often made explicitly 
during the development of the rules.38  In order for businesses 
increasingly engaged in interstate commerce to anticipate legal 
responsibilities, national legal uniformity looked ever more 
desirable.  This line of thinking led to a movement for uniform 
substantive laws,39 which naturally grew to include procedures as 
well.40  Again, to the extent that states maintained different 
procedures, the attraction of federal rulemaking as a salve was 
diminished because like cases could still receive differing 
procedural treatment based on whether the case was filed in federal 
or state court.  And again, the response was that federal-state 
disuniformity was more tolerable than intra-federal disuniformity, 
                                                          
37
 For discussions of this substantive concept of procedural equality, see 
Rubenstein, supra note 7, at 1893-98; Subrin, Federal Rules, supra note 9, at 
2047; Jerry Mashaw, The Supreme Court Due Process Calculus for 
Administrative Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of 
a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28, 52 (1976) (describing the desire to 
reach similar outcomes in similar cases as “intuitively obvious”).   
38
 See Subrin, Federal Rules, supra note 9, at 2006 (“This ‘uniform federal 
rules’ theme ended up with four strands: interdistrict court uniformity, intrastate 
uniformity, trans-substantive uniformity, and, although this was not stressed, 
uniformity of result”). 
39
 See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 70-440, pt. 2, at 10 (1928) (“The development of the 
economic resources of the country has brought with it problems that know no 
boundaries, and and a growing consciousness of the commercial necessity for 
national uniformity both in law and its administration.”) 
40
 To be sure, there was not a complete overlap between the movement for 
uniform laws and the federal rulemaking movement.  In particular, many did not 
see the two as related because they did not view procedure as having a 
meaningful impact on substantive outcomes.  See Robert G. Bone,  Making 
Effective Rules: The Need for Procedure Theory, 61 OKLA L. REV. 319, 329 
(2008) (“The 1938 Federal Rule drafters thought that substance had little, if any, 
role to play; in their view, most procedural rules could be justified by process 
values without referring to substance at all.”). 
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and also that full uniformity was the expected and inevitable end of 
the federal rulemaking movement.41  
 
3. Efficiency 
 
 A third claimed benefit of trans-territoriality is enhanced 
efficiency in the federal procedural system.  To a large extent, 
efficiency claims are retreads of the claims already discussed, 
albeit with a different emphasis.  So, for example, in addition to 
arguing that lawyers would benefit from uniform federal rules 
because they would be able to practice nationally, Shelton and 
others emphasized that uniform rules would save client resources 
by permitting them to retain a single firm to respond to federal 
liability that was national in scope.42  Another source of waste 
targeted by proponents of national uniformity was the time and 
effort devoted to sorting out whether the state rule or the federal 
rule should apply in a given situation, both at the trial and appellate 
levels.43  Trans-territoriality greatly reduced those resources by 
making the federal rules presumptively applicable.44  And if states 
were to follow the federal lead, then the efficiencies attributable to 
trans-territoriality would be much greater still, in part because 
lawyers would only have to master a single set of procedural rules 
and in part because time and energy would have to be devoted to 
only a single rulemaking process. 
 
 
                                                          
41
 See Jay Tidmarsh, Pound’s Century, and Ours, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 513, 
540 n.118 (2006) (quoting Thomas Shelton “a simple, scientific, correlated 
system of rules, such as would be prepared and promulgated by the Supreme 
Court of the United States, would prove a model that would, for reasons of 
convenience as well as of principle, be adopted by the states”). 
42
 1915 Senate Hearings, supra note 18, at 13-14 (statements of Thomas 
Shelton). 
43
 See S. Rep. No. 64-892, at 2-3 (1917) (“That cases should be delayed month 
after month, and sometimes year after year, should be reversed and tried and 
retried, upon mere matters of practice that in no way touch the essential merits, 
is one of the reproaches in the administration of the law which has had a greater 
tendency to bring the practices of the courts into disrepute than any other 
thing.”); Lile, Uniform Procedure at Law in the Federal Courts, 76 CENT. L.J. 
214, 214 (1913). 
44
 Again, there is a similarity to Erie here.  See supra note 14.  In Erie itself, the 
Court arguably created inefficiency by requiring parties and judges to litigate the 
question of which procedures apply in diversity cases.  Hanna v. Plumer 
reduced much of that inefficiency by making the federal rules presumptively 
applicable when on point.   
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4. Complete uniformity 
 
All of the previous benefits of trans-territorial procedure in 
the federal system were undermined at least to some extent by the 
fact that states remained free to create their own procedural 
systems.  This meant that cases could be subject to competing 
procedural requirements, thus creating just the sort of complexity 
that Shelton and others sought to avoid.  By itself, the imposition 
of federal uniformity did nothing to guarantee the “fixed” system 
that corporations apparently desired.  And the confusion wrought 
by the project of federal trans-territoriality was arguably far worse 
for practicing lawyers because it affected those who practiced 
within the territorial boundaries of a single state.45  Rather than 
creating the complete uniformity that would produce meaningful 
benefits for the economy and the bar, the federal rules appeared to 
promise an exchange of one form of partial uniformity for another. 
Proponents of the federal rules conceded that complete 
uniformity should be the goal, but they considered that goal to be 
not only attainable but likely under their approach.  In their view, 
states were likely to follow the lead of the federal rules, and the 
eventual result would be not just the creation of federal uniformity 
but the restoration of intra-state uniformity as well.46  Early returns 
along these lines were promising,47 and some states continue to 
                                                          
45
 This was Walsh’s primary argument against trans-territoriality.   He argued 
that most lawyers still practiced within a single state, and that uniform federal 
procedure would disrupt their practice for the proposed benefit of those few who 
practiced nationally. Subrin, Federal Rules, supra note 9, at 2008. 
46
 To borrow Professor Subrin’s phrase, “[t]he federal rules were to be an 
enlightened magnet.” Id. at 2026.  See also Shapiro, supra note 20, at 1974-75 
(describing the rulemakers as “sufficiently imbued with their mission to hope 
that their rules would set a model that the states themselves would want to 
follow”) (citing Edson R. Sunderland, The Grant of Rule-Making Power to the 
Supreme Court of the United States, 32 MICH. L. REV. 1116, 1128-29 (1934)); 
Glenn S. Koppel, Toward a New Federalism in State Civil Justice; Developing a 
Uniform Code of State Civil Procedure Through a Collaborative Rule-Making 
Process, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1170, 1179 (2005).  The idea that a federal 
standard would be an “enlightened magnet” that states would find irresistible is 
reminiscent of the Supreme Court’s flawed assumption with respect to federal 
general common law in Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. 1 (1842).  States in that context 
proved themselves willing to resist the allure of the federally created example.  
And they have done so here as well, see infra note 50. 
47
 Subrin, supra note 9, at 2028-29 (noting that four southwestern states were 
relatively quick to adopt the Federal Rules verbatim – Arizona (1940), Colorado 
(1941), New Mexico (1942), and Utah (1950) – with the goal of fostering 
procedure system easily navigated by practitioners); Chen, supra note 19, at 
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replicate the federal rules in the interest of preserving intra-state 
uniformity.48  But we have never come close to universal adoption 
of the federal rules, and indeed the most recent sustained study 
found that the gap between federal and state procedures is 
widening.49  Despite the failure in practical terms to achieve it, full 
procedural uniformity remains a goal that figured into the selection 
of the new system of federal rules over the existing conformity 
regime. 
 
II.   LOCAL RULES AS A PROCEDURAL SCOURGE 
 
 If trans-territoriality is one of the heroes of the federal 
procedural regime, then local rules have been steadily cast in the 
role of villain.  This is because local rules are the most visible 
source of territorial variation in the federal procedural system, 
which makes them the most obvious deviation from the 
aspirational norm of trans-territoriality.  This Part reviews the 
longstanding and ongoing debate over local rules.  It first describes 
the current approach toward local rules in the federal system, and 
explains how that approach has changed over time, particularly 
with respect to promulgation and enforcement.  It then reviews the 
numerous complaints that have been laid at the feet of local rules, 
most of which are rooted in a commitment to trans-territorial 
procedure and a parallel resistance to territorial variation. 
 
A. A Primer on Local Rules 
 
 The authority for local rules is clear and unassailable:  
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 83(a), which has been part of the 
federal rules since their inception, permits district courts to “adopt 
                                                                                                                                  
1437 (discussing the development of “federal replica” states – a state that has 
adopted the Federal Rules – beginning with Arizona in 1940). 
48
 John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts; A 
Survey of State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1367 
(1986) (classifying twenty-three states as federal replicas, many of whom 
identify intra-state uniformity as its guiding value). 
49
 John B. Oakley, A Fresh Look at the Federal Rules in State Courts, 3 NEV. 
L.J. 354, 358-59 (2002) (finding that sixty-two percent of United States 
population live in jurisdictions “governed by substantially nonfederal systems of 
procedure” and that state movements towards replicating the federal procedural 
system were “noticeably slackening”). 
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and amend rules governing its practice.”50  The scope of the 
authority provided is not unlimited, however; local rules must “be 
consistent with – but not duplicate – federal statutes and rules.”51  
While that limitation is not insignificant, it leaves substantial room 
for district courts to create a set of localized procedures, and every 
district court has done so.52  The resulting 94 sets of local rules are, 
like the federal rules, formal and fixed.  Unlike the federal rules, 
however, local rules are not subject to the rulemaking process 
outlined in 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072-74, but are instead promulgated 
after notice and comment and upon a majority vote of district 
judges.53 
Local rules vary considerably in terms of both content and 
significance.  Many local rules announce technical and relatively 
mundane requirements related to issues like filing and motions 
practice.54  Rules detailing paper size and method of binding are 
staples of local rules,55 designed primarily to facilitate the work of 
                                                          
50
 FED. R. CIV. P. 83(a)(1).  Local rules must be issued after “notice and an 
opportunity for comment,” and must be supported by a majority of the district 
judges comprising a district court.  Id.   
51
 FED. R. CIV. P. 83(a)(1).  For a time, it looked as though another limitation, 
created not by the rules themselves but by the Supreme Court, might be 
imposed: local rules should not introduce “basic procedural innovations.”  Miner 
v. Atlass, 363 U.S. 641, 650 (1960) (favoring the formal rulemaking process and 
its “mature consideration of informed opinion”).  But the Court has not appeared 
willing to police the limitation, and the experience with civil jury size seriously 
undermines its force.  See Richard L. Marcus, Slouching Toward Discretion, 78 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1561, 1582-83 (discussing the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 159-60 (1973), which upheld local rules 
changing the size of the civil jury). 
52
 See http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/distr-localrules.html for a list of current 
local rules. 
53
 FED. R. CIV. P. 83(a)(1). 
54
 See, e.g., E.D. Cal. L.R. 77-121(b) (“The regular office hours of the Clerk at 
Sacramento and Fresno shall be from 8:30 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. each day except 
Saturdays, Sundays, legal holidays, and such other times so ordered by the Chief 
Judge.”).  More recently, local rules describing electronic filing requirements 
have become common.  See, e.g., W.D.N.C. R. 5.2.1(B) (“All documents 
submitted for filing in this district shall be filed electronically unless expressly 
exempted from electronic filing either by the Administrative Procedures or by 
the assigned judge.”). 
55
 See, e.g., E.D. Cal. L.R. 7-130(b) (“All documents presented for conventional 
filing or lodging and the chambers courtesy copies shall be on white, unglazed 
opaque paper of good quality with numbered lines in the left margin, 8-1/2” x 
11” in size, and shall be flat, unfolded (except where necessary for presentation 
of exhibits), firmly bound at the top left corner, pre-punched with two (2) holes 
(approximately 1/4” diameter) centered 2-3/4” apart, ½” to 5/8” from the top 
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the clerk’s office. But not all rules fit that description, and some 
impose substantial procedural requirements.  For example, many 
districts now have local rules that structure the summary judgment 
process, including details relating to the form and the nature of the 
filings that must be submitted.56   
Because local rules vary from district to district, lawyers 
who practice in multiple districts must master multiple sets of 
formal procedural packages.57  Thus far, the Advisory Committee 
has responded to the burdens imposed by inter-district variations in 
local rules not by removing or narrowing the authority to issue 
them,58 but instead by instituting measures designed to facilitate 
                                                                                                                                  
edge of the document, and shall comply with all other applicable provisions of 
these Rules.”). 
56
 See, e.g., N.D. Ill. L.R. 56.1; for a discussion of cases enforcing N.D. Ill. L.R. 
56.1, see infra notes 67-69 and accompanying text. 
57
 See G.J.B. & Associates, Inc. v. Singleton, 913 F.2d 824, 831 (10th Cir. 1990) 
(“Counsel appearing before the district court are duty-bound to know the 
practice of the district court.”). 
58
 In the 1985 amendments, the advisory committee did alter the rule to 
“enhance the local rulemaking process by requiring appropriate public notice of 
proposed rules and an opportunity to comment on them.” FED. R. CIV. P. 83 
advisory committee notes.  But this modification retained the scope of local 
rulemaking authority, and was explicitly made “without impairing the 
procedural validity of existing local rules.” Id.  Several commentators have 
suggested that the authority for local rulemaking authority be narrowed.  See, 
e.g., Linda J. Rusch, Separation of Powers Analysis as a Method for 
Determining the Validity of Federal Districts Courts’ Exercise of Local 
Rulemaking Power; Application to Local Rules Mandating Alternative Dispute 
Resolution, 23 CONN. L. REV. 483, 497 (1991) (arguing that the federal courts’ 
judgment about procedure should be subordinated to congressional judgment in 
order to “ensure that Congress makes the important decisions about procedure”).  
 While the Advisory Committee has declined to decrease the authority for 
local rulemaking, it has also declined to increase it.  Most notably, the 
Committee withdrew two proposed amendments to Rule 83 that would have 
permitted district courts to introduce local rules that were inconsistent with the 
federal rules, at least on an experimental basis.  See Committee on Rules of 
Practice & Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the U.S., Preliminary Draft 
of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the 
Federal Rules of Evidence, reprinted in 137 F.R.D. 53, 152 (1991) (“With the 
approval of the Judicial Conference of the United States, a district court may 
adopt an experimental local rule inconsistent with [the national rules]”); 
Committee on Rules of Practice & Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the 
U.S., Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rules Governing Section 2254 
Cases in the United States District Courts, and Rules Governing Section 2255 
Proceedings in the United States District Courts, reprinted in 98 F.R.D. 337, 370 
(1983) (“When authorized by the judicial council, a district court may adopt on 
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identification and compliance and to decrease sanctions for non-
compliance in certain cases.59  In particular, the 1995 amendments 
to Rule 83 included two notable new provisions.  First, Rule 
83(a)(1) was modified to require local rules to “conform to any 
uniform numbering system prescribed by the Judicial Conference 
of the United States.”60  This addition was intended to avoid 
“unnecessary traps for counsel and litigants” by “mak[ing] it easier 
for an increasingly national bar and for litigants to locate a local 
rule that applies to a particular procedural issue.”61  Second, the 
same set of amendments added a provision – FRCP 83(a)(2) – that 
prevents the court from depriving a party of rights as a result of a 
“nonwillful failure to comply” with a “local rule imposing a 
requirement of form.”62  Again, the advisory notes reflect an 
awareness that lawyers may be burdened by the complexities of 
local rules, and may therefore be unaware or forgetful of formal 
requirements contained there.63 
Although the addition of Rule 83(a)(2) limits the 
availability of sanctions, it simultaneously confirms that some 
local rules – namely, those that do not impose “a requirement of 
form” – may be enforced to deprive a party of rights.   Local rules 
in that category essentially operate as functional equivalents to the 
federal rules; district courts demand compliance, and may strictly 
enforce the rules or impose sanctions when procedural 
requirements are not followed.  Some districts include specific 
provisions highlighting the availability of sanctions for violations 
of local rules.64  But even in the absence of such a provision, 
sanctions for failure to heed the requirements of local rules have 
                                                                                                                                  
an experimental basis for no longer than two years a local rule that may not be 
challenged for inconsistency with [the national rules].”).  See also Marcus, supra 
note 51, at 1584 n.95. 
59
 Congress has intervened, too.  See 28 U.S.C. § 2071(c)(1) (1988) (permitting 
the “judicial council of the relevant circuit” to modify or abrogate local rules).  
60
 FED. R. CIV. P. 83(a)(1). 
61
 FED. R. CIV. P. 83 advisory committee notes. 
62
 FED. R. CIV. P. 83(a)(2).   
63
 FED. R. CIV. P. 83 advisory committee notes. (“[A] party should not be 
deprived of a right to a jury trial because its attorney, unaware or – of forgetting 
– a local rule directing that jury demands be noted in the caption of the case, 
includes a jury demand only in the body of the pleading.”). 
64
 See, e.g., M.D. Ala. LR 1.2 (“The court may impose a sanction for the 
violation of any local rule. Imposition of sanctions will lie within the sound 
discretion of the judge whose case is affected.”). 
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been upheld when challenged in the appellate courts.65  For 
example, in a series of cases, the Seventh Circuit has affirmed the 
entry of summary judgment in cases where a non-movant fails to 
comply with the procedural requirements of N.D. Ill. LR 56.1.66  In 
doing so, the court has recognized that the rule “impose[s] a 
burden on the attorneys for the parties,”67 but has nevertheless 
emphasized that “strict, consistent, ‘bright-line’ enforcement is 
essential to obtaining compliance … and to ensuring that long-run 
aggregate benefits in efficiency inure to district courts.”68 
 
B.  A Primer on Local Rules Critique 
 
Notwithstanding their pedigree, local rules have faced 
consistent criticism since the federal rules were promulgated in 
1938.  This section undertakes a short review of that criticism, 
which has taken many forms ranging from claims that frequent 
deviations from trans-territoriality are inconsistent with the 
original intent of Rule 83 to claims that such deviations are 
undesirable for various functional reasons.  Particulars aside, the 
core of the criticism about local rules is that they disrupt the trans-
territoriality that is a central procedural value of the federal system.  
An initial complaint is that the fundamental constraint that 
local rules be consistent with and not duplicative of existing 
federal rules has frequently been ignored.69 From the very 
                                                          
65
 Not all efforts to impose sanctions for violations of local rules have been 
upheld.  See, e.g., Zambrano v. City of Tustin, 885 F.2d 1473, 1480 (9th Cir. 
1989) (“[W]e do not think that the imposition of financial sanctions for mere 
negligent violations of the local rules is consistent with the intent of Congress or 
with the restraint required of the federal courts in sanction cases.”).  But in cases 
where the sanction has been viewed as an abuse of discretion, the basis for that 
finding has been that the sanction imposed was not proportional to the violation 
at issue, not that local rules are entitled to a lesser degree of enforcement than 
the federal rules.  
66
  See, e.g., Koszola v. Board of Educ. of City of Chicago, 385 F.3d 1104 (7th 
Cir. 2004); Waldridge v. American Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 921-22 (7th 
Cir. 1994) (collecting cases where strict enforcement of local summary 
judgment rules has been upheld).  Implicit in Koszola and other cases decided 
after the 1995 addition of Rule 83(a)(2) is a determination that LR 56.1 does not 
merely impose a “requirement of form.” 
67
 Markham v. White, 172 F.3d 486, 490 (7th Cir. 1999). 
68
 Midwest Imports, Ltd. v. Coval, 71 F.3d 1311, 1316 (7th Cir. 1995).  
69
 See Subrin, Federal Rules, supra note 9, at 2019 (1985 Judiciary Committee 
report “identified several problems concerning local rules, such as their 
promulgation without sufficient input, the tremendous numbers [sic] of such 
rules, and the frequent conflict between local rules and the Federal Rules”). 
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beginning, federal districts introduced local rules that were at least 
arguably inconsistent with the federal rules, and as early as 1940 a 
federal committee commented on the danger such rules imposed to 
the goal of national uniformity.70  Similarly, in the 1980s, the 
Judicial Conference sponsored a Local Rules Project, which found 
and catalogued a variety of local rules that seemed to contradict the 
consistency limitation in Rule 83.71  The existence of local rules 
that directly conflict with extant federal rules has the potential to 
undermine the supremacy of the federal rulemaking process.72  Not 
only is this theoretically troubling, but it also contributes to a 
practical problem:  counsel will reasonably be uncertain about 
whether the federal rule or the local rule will ultimately be 
enforced.73 
 Restricting local rules to those that comply with the 
consistency restraint would address these problems, of course, and 
indeed many critics have called for more rigorous enforcement of 
the clear language of Rule 83.74  But most criticisms of local rules 
go much further, and target even those rules that undeniably 
comply with that language.  These broader critiques are based in 
part on a claim that the intended scope of Rule 83 was sufficiently 
narrow that local rules would be used only sparingly.75  Proposals 
                                                          
70
 See Report on Local District Court Rules, 4 Fed. R. Serv. (Callaghan) 969 
(1940) (“Knox Committee” Report).  
71
 See Comm. on Rules of Practice & Procedure of the Judicial Conference of 
the U.S., Report of the Local Rules Project 1-7 (1988). 
72
 Sisk, supra note 9, at 5 (discussing the destruction of procedural uniformity 
among the appellate system due to the promulgation of local rules which conflict 
with the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure). 
73
 Id.; Subrin, Federal Rules, supra note 9, at 2016-17 (noting that local rules 
“create inconsistencies in practice among the various districts and leave doubt 
and uncertainty in the minds of the bench and bar”). 
74
 See David M. Roberts, The Myth of Uniformity in Federal Civil Procedure: 
Federal Civil Rule 83 and District Court Local Rulemaking Powers, 8 U. PUGET 
SOUND L. REV. 537, 540-42 (1985) (arguing that a failure to enforce the 
consistency requirement of Rule 83 has allowed for the promulgation of local 
rules directly in conflict with their federal counterparts); Charles Alan Wright, 
Arthur R. Miller & Richard L. Marcus, Evolving Treatment of the Problem of 
Local Rules, 12 Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 3152 (2nd ed. 1973). 
75
 Erwin Chemerinsky & Barry Friedman, The Fragmentation of Federal Rules, 
46 MERCER L. REV. 757, 784 (1995) (“Absent some better reason, it is 
insufficient simply to argue in favor of local rules for no other reason than that 
locals like to do things a certain way”); Paul D. Carrington, A New 
Confederacy? Disunionism in the Federal Courts, 45 DUKE L.J. 929, 944 (1996) 
(discussing the intent of the rulemakers that Rule 83 be used only on the rare 
occasions which functionally demand localization); Tobias, supra note 9, at 538 
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to permit and even encourage broad authority for localized 
rulemaking were considered but rejected, and ultimately national 
uniformity was embraced as the prevailing model.76  While Rule 
83 was still included in the final product, its inclusion did not 
signify a desire to promote local rules as a means of filling any 
gaps that might have been left open by the federal rules.  Rather, 
the Rule was intended to provide authority only for the rare 
occasions when the federal rulemakers deliberately left gaps to be 
filled by local needs.77  Thus, the use of Rule 83 for a broader gap-
filling purpose is against the spirit of the federal design, even if the 
resulting local rules technically comply with the consistency 
restraint. 
 The preceding argument is not merely a technical one about 
intent.  Critics also cite a functional reason to interpret and apply 
the authority conferred by Rule 83 narrowly:  the proliferation of 
local rules creates a morass of applicable rules in the federal 
system that directly conflicts with the procedural goals served by 
trans-territoriality.78  Local rules run counter to the goal of 
nationalization because they disadvantage non-local counsel - 
often explicitly so.79  At the extreme, variations in local rules also 
threaten the equal treatment of like cases and may contribute to 
forum shopping.80  This result is especially troubling because 
                                                                                                                                  
(“The Committee apparently envisioned that districts would sparingly invoke 
Rule 83 to address unusual, troubling local circumstances and expressly 
prohibited the adoption of local procedures which conflicted with the federal 
rules”). 
76
 See notes 23-27 and accompanying text.  
77
 Carrington, supra note 75, at 944 (recognizing the limit intentional imposed 
on the use of Rule 83 to matters “such as the setting of motion days”); Tobias, 
supra note 9, at 538 (discussing the Advisory Committee’s intent to have judges 
sparingly invoke Rule 83 for promulgation of local procedural rules).  
78
 Critics also complain that local rules undermine the procedural value of trans-
substantivity. See, e.g., Subrin, supra note 9, at 2025-26 (noting that the use of 
local rules to fashion different procedures for particular types of cases in 
different locations “reduces intrastate and interdistrict court procedural 
uniformity”). 
79
 Lauren Robel, Fracture Procedure: The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 46 
STAN. L. REV. 1447, 1484 (1994) (“Local procedures typically favor local 
bars.”); Chemerinsky & Friedman, supra note 75 (“The premise of the federal 
courts is that they reflect one court system doing the nation's business. 
Permitting a profusion of local rules for the simple reason that local practioners 
[sic] are familiar with them inappropriately disadvantages litigants and their 
counsel coming from out of state.”). 
80
 Keeton, supra note 9, at 860 (noting that national uniformity serves the 
fundamental interest that disputes should be treated alike and resolved on the 
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districts often fail to explain the reasons for their adoption of a 
particular rule, which increases the likelihood that participants and 
observers of the legal system will perceive variations as random 
rather than well-considered.81  Finally, local rules are viewed by 
many as a source of inefficiency in federal practice, both because 
lawyers must devote resources to mastering multiple sets of local 
rules and because clients may be forced to retain local counsel for 
each federal district involved in a complex case.82 
 A different strain of criticism focuses on perceived 
deficiencies in the way that local rules are promulgated and 
reviewed.83  Whereas federal rules are introduced only after a 
thorough process that includes a broad group of participants and 
several layers of review, the process leading to the introduction of 
local rules is relatively more truncated.84  For one thing, fewer 
                                                                                                                                  
merits, rather than being subject to manipulation based on judge shopping or 
forum shopping). 
81
 Carrington, supra note 75, at 945-46 (noting that “the primary task of each 
federal court is essentially the same in all districts, and the differences among 
them seldom suggest reasons for material differences in the procedure employed 
in different districts”); Tobias, Local Federal Civil Procedure, supra note 9, at 
577 (discussing the loss of respect for the civil litigation system that occurs 
when the public “believes that the procedures available or the character of 
justice can vary substantially across districts, that the nature of justice reflects 
lawsuits' magnitude or subject matter, that attorneys' or clients' resources affect 
the quality of justice, or that complexities or technicalities preclude or restrict 
the vindication of rights”). 
82
 See, e.g., Sisk, supra note 9, at 6 (arguing that local rule variations 
“complicate practice and increase the cost of compliance with procedural rules” 
while simultaneously requiring “inordinate expenditures of attorney time on 
relatively minor matters”); Tobias, Local Federal Civil Procedure, supra note 9, 
at 575 (“The need to search for, understand, and comply with increasingly 
arcane local requirements may well have imposed greater expense and delay in 
federal civil litigation.”); Coquillette, Squiers & Subrin, supra note 12, at 62 
(noting that the only safe course of action for a client whose case spills into 
multiple federal districts may be to “retain additional counsel in each federal 
district for the case”). 
83
 Some of these process concerns have been addressed by modifications to Rule 
83.  In particular, the 1985 rule amendments responded to criticisms regarding 
the lack of non-judicial input “by requiring appropriate public notice of 
proposed rules and an opportunity to comment on them.” See supra note 54; 
Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. ___, * 8-12 (emphasizing the role of notice 
and comment in the promulgation of local rules). 
84
 Keeton, supra note 9 (suggesting that the safeguards of the federal rule-
making process – widespread involvement of national actors and extensive 
deliberation by those actors – make it more desirable than the system of 
individualized promulgation for local rules); Flanders, supra note 10, at 256-57 
(describing the method by which local rules are promulgated as failing to meet 
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participants are involved.  Of course, it is precisely the narrower 
geographical scope of the participants that permits local rules to 
reflect local rather than national priorities.  Even so, the lack of 
broader input has led to some concern that local rules are adopted 
on the basis of inadequate information.85  In addition, there are 
fewer steps in the process leading to the adoption of local rules.  
For many years, that process essentially consisted of deliberation 
involving only the judges of the relevant local district.86  Although 
Rule 83 has been amended to now require an opportunity for 
notice and comment, district judges remain the ultimate arbiters of 
whether local rules are adopted or abandoned.  This has led to a 
concern that local rules are often a simple reflection of the 
temporary whims of the majority of a district’s judges,87 and that 
concern is exacerbated by the limited and ineffective review of 
local rules by the Judicial Conference and the appellate courts.88   
 A final set of complaints emphasizes the relationship 
between local rules and the federal rulemaking process.  For 
example, Erwin Chemerinsky has argued that the local rulemaking 
device permits federal rulemakers to avoid difficult questions that 
should properly be resolved at the national level.89  Conversely, 
local actors who perceive a need for a shift in the rules may focus 
their efforts at the local level rather than seeking desirable national 
                                                                                                                                  
the “high standard set by the national process” and noting that the practice of 
consulting with a committee of local practitioners during the drafting of local 
rules is “the exception rather than the rule” (quoting 12 C. WRIGHT & A. 
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3152, at 220 (1973))). 
85
 Subrin, Federal Rules supra note 9, at 2019-20 (identifying the “lack of 
sufficient input” during promulgation of local rules as one of the problems 
identified in the 1985 Judiciary Committee report on local rules). 
86
 See Coquillette, Squiers & Subrin, supra note 12 (complaining about the lack 
of opportunity for notice and comment under the pre-1985 version of Rule 83). 
87
 Flanders, supra note 10, at 218 (noting that many critics of local rules believe 
that these rules are usually “developed with minimal consultation and often 
represent the whims and idiosyncrasies of temporary majorities of judges”);  
Keeton, supra note 9  (“[N]ationally uniform rules protect . . . against the 
tyranny of any unduly willful renegades among us trial judges.”); Subrin, 
Federal Rules, supra note 9 at 2042. 
88
 See Sisk, supra note 9, at 51 (discussing limited review by the Judicial 
Conference); Flanders, supra note 10, at 218 (describing the inadequacy of the 
appellate process for monitoring the validity of local rules). 
89
 Chemerinsky & Friedman, supra note 5, at 779 (explaining that local rules can 
politically benefit federal decision makers by allowing them to “duck deciding a 
hard question by leaving it to local rules to handle”, especially in highly 
controversial areas where proposed solutions are likely to produce intense 
disagreement). 
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reform.90  Lauren Robel has similarly suggested that local rules 
undermine the federal rulemaking process because they are too 
often rooted in a sense that a national rule is incorrect rather than 
simply incomplete.91  Thus, local rules in practice may represent a 
form of disobedience, and one that deflects energy away from a 
valuable national conversation about the desirability of the federal 
rules. 
  
III.   THE UNIVERSE OF TERRITORIAL VARIATION 
 
 Local rules are the most obvious form of procedural 
disuniformity, and also the most frequently criticized.  But they are 
certainly not the only form.  This Part widens the lens to resituate 
local rules as one form of territorial variation in the federal system 
among many.  Some varieties, like standing orders, are quite 
similar in nature and function to local rules.  Others, like variations 
in interpretation or the exercise of judicial discretion, are 
structurally different.  Whereas local rules create formal variations 
in the body of procedural rules, differences in interpretation create 
differences in the way that formally uniform rules are applied in 
practice.  For that reason, it may be argued that these varieties do 
not create disuniformity at all, but that argument necessarily rests 
on a cramped and unrealistic view of uniformity.92  Finally, other 
varieties, like the use of inherent authority and the development of 
procedural common law, occur outside the domain of the federal 
rules themselves.  Again, this might suggest that the formal 
uniformity of the rules is not threatened.  But even if that is true, 
these varieties contribute to territorial variations in the procedural 
requirements that are imposed and enforced, whether as the result 
of a formal rule or not. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
90
 Id. (finding that a sense of localism may contribute to the lack of uniformity in 
local rules because individuals may feel that local solutions will produce more 
satisfaction and are easier to implement). 
91
 Robel, supra note 79 (“Local court tinkering with the Federal Rules is rarely 
inspired by the disutility of a Rule under local conditions.  Rather, it is inspired 
by a belief that the rulemakers got it wrong”). 
92
 See Subrin, Federal Rules, supra note 9, at 2047-48 (arguing that uniformity 
should encompass uniformity of result, and not simply textual uniformity).  For 
further discussion of this point, see infra Part IV.A.  
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A. Standing Orders    
 
 Unlike local rules, which operate at the level of the district 
court, standing orders operate more narrowly, at the level of the 
individual district judge.  The present authority for standing orders 
is the same as that for local rules,93 and the permissible scope of 
standing orders is similarly limited by a consistency requirement.  
But requiring standing orders to be consistent with federal law, 
federal rules, and local rules still leaves room for variation, and so 
it is unsurprising that standing orders vary significantly in terms of 
their level of detail and the nature of their requirements.94  
                                                          
93
 Rule 83(b) permits a judge to “regulate practice in any manner consistent with 
federal law, rules adopted under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072 and 2075, and the district’s 
local rules.” FED. R. CIV. P. 83(b).  This language was originally added as a part 
of the 1985 amendments to Rule 83, and was moved to subsection b as part of 
the 1995 amendments.  Prior to 1985, the authority of judges to issue and 
enforce standing orders was understood to be part of the court’s inherent 
authority.  See infra Part I.C.  For a general discussion of standing orders, see 
Myron J. Bromberg & Jonathan M. Korn, Individual Judges' Practices: An 
Inadvertent Subversion of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 68 ST. JOHN'S 
L. REV. 1 (1994). 
94
 Many standing orders clarify the judge’s preference with respect to 
scheduling.  So, for example, in the Northern District of Illinois, Judge Milton I. 
Shadur’s standing orders set cases for status conferences 49 days after filing of 
the complaint, while Judge Robert W. Gettleman sets cases for status 60 days 
after filing  See Northern District of Illinois Judges, UNITED STATES DISTRICT 
COURT: NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS, Feb. 22, 2010, 
http://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/home/Judges.aspx (available under the “Initial 
Status Conference” link for each judge).  Other standing orders impose 
requirements that are fairly substantive in nature. For example, Judge Frank D. 
Whitney (W.D.N.C.) requires that “every preliminary motion shall . . . include, 
or be accompanied by, a brief statement of the factual and legal grounds on 
which the motion is based. A memorandum of law shall always state the 
“Bottom Line Up Front”—that is, the interlocutory paragraph(s) shall: (i) 
identify with particularity each issue in dispute; (ii) concisely (i.e., in one or two 
sentences) state why the party should prevail on the issue, directing the Court’s 
attention to what the party believes to be the controlling legal authority or 
critical fact in contention; and (iii) if applicable, state the remedy or relief 
sought.”  Initial Scheduling Order, Misc. No. 3:07-MC-47 (Doc. No. 2), section 
3, subsection b, paragraph iii, available at 
http://www.ncwd.uscourts.gov/Documents/Whitney/StandingOrderGoverningCi
vilCaseManagement.pdf. Finally, some standing orders impose requirements 
that directly contradict the parallel local rule.  For example, Judge Sidney A. 
Fitzwater (N.D. Tex.) modifies local civil rule 16.4, which requires a pretrial 
order to be submitted at least 10 days before the scheduled date for trial, by 
forcing proposed orders to be submitted no later than 14 days prior to the date of 
the trial setting.  Chief District Judge Sidney A. Fitzwater, UNITED STATES 
DISTRICT COURT: NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS, Feb. 22, 2010, 
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The requirements for creation and promulgation of standing 
orders are remarkably informal.  Unlike federal rules, which must 
pass through the formal rulemaking procedures outlined in 28 
U.S.C. §§ 2072-2074, and unlike local rules, which must receive 
the support of a majority of the district judges after a notice and 
comment period dictated by Rule 83(a),95 standing orders can 
simply be issued by an individual district judge.  At least in theory, 
this informality is counterbalanced by two restrictions on standing 
orders that go beyond the consistency requirement already 
discussed.  First, the advisory notes express a “hope[] that each 
district will adopt procedures, perhaps by local rule, for 
promulgating and reviewing single-judge standing orders.”96  More 
importantly, the 1995 amendments acknowledge “that courts rely 
on multiple directives to control practice,” and that “the sheer 
volume of directives may pose an unreasonable barrier.”97  As with 
the amendments relating to local rules, Rule 83(b) responds to that 
barrier not by circumscribing the permissible scope of standing 
orders, but by requiring actual notice to litigants before standing 
orders may be enforced to impose a “sanction or other 
disadvantage.”98 Actual notice is often achieved by making 
standing orders publicly available on a court website and by 
referring parties to those orders.99 
                                                                                                                                  
http://www.txnd.uscourts.gov/judges/sfitz_req.html (under section I, subsection 
F). 
95
 28 U.S.C. § 2071(b) also requires notice and comment before a local rule may 
be issued. 
96
 FED. R. CIV. P. 83 advisory committee’s note (1985 Amendment). See Carl 
Tobias, Suggestions for Circuit Court Review of Local Procedures, 52 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 359, 364 (1995) (“some circuit judicial councils initiated rigorous 
efforts, and others made laudable attempts, to comply with the requirements that 
Rule 83 and the 1988 JIA imposed on them”).  But see Bromberg & Korn, supra 
note 93, at 9 (“Unfortunately, however, judicial councils have not taken an 
active role in reviewing the consistency of either local district court rules or 
individual judges’ standing orders and practices with the Federal Rules.”).  
97
 FED. R. CIV. P. 83 advisory committee’s note (1995 Amendment). 
98
 FED. R. CIV. P. 83(b) (“No sanction or other disadvantage may be imposed for 
noncompliance with any requirement not in federal law, federal rules, or the 
local rules unless the alleged violator has been furnished in the particular case 
with actual notice of the requirement.”). 
99
 See 1995 Advisory Notes (“Furnishing litigants with a copy outlining the 
judge’s practices . . . would suffice to give actual notice, as would an order in a 
case specifically adopting by reference a judge’s standing order and indicating 
how copies can be obtained.”).  See also Tucker v. Colorado Dept. of Public 
Health and Environment, 104 Fed.Appx. 704, 707-08 (10th Cir. 2004) 
(unpublished) (finding “actual notice” satisfied where district judge issued a 
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Standing orders that meet the consistency and notice 
requirements may be enforced, and sanctions for noncompliance 
have withstood challenges on appeal.100  In Tucker v. Colorado 
Department of Health and Environment, for example, the Tenth 
Circuit affirmed the entry of summary judgment after the non-
movant failed to comply with a standing order that required 
specific references to the record.101  In essence, the judge’s 
standing order in Tucker was treated as an equivalent to the local 
rules at issue in the Seventh Circuit cases described above, except 
that a finding of actual notice was required to justify enforcement.  
But some appellate courts have not been willing to put standing 
orders on an equal footing with local rules, and have expressed 
hesitation about the imposition of sanctions for nonwillful failures 
to comply.  An example of this more restrained approach is found 
in United States v. Brown.102  There, the Ninth Circuit 
acknowledged that violations of local rules may be sanctioned 
absent a finding of bad faith, but refused to apply the same 
standard to standing orders.103   Although both local rules and 
standing orders are explicitly authorized by Rule 83, the court 
recognized a distinction in treatment based on the fact that standing 
orders are issued without notice and comment.104 Accordingly, the 
district court’s sanctioning authority with respect to standing 
orders was deemed to derive from inherent rather than 
congressional authority.105 
 Regardless of the precise standard necessary to sustain 
sanctions for noncompliance, standing orders may not simply be 
ignored.  To the contrary, they represent an additional procedural 
layer that creates variations even within a given federal district.   
                                                                                                                                  
case management order that “notified counsel that they could receive copies of 
the summary judgment rules from the clerk’s office and from the court’s 
website”). 
100
 See, e.g., Tucker, 104 Fed.Appx. at 707 (“Pursuant to [Rule 83(b)], a district 
judge may establish personal ‘standing orders’ regulating practice before his 
court (and subsequently punish parties for violating those rules), so long as (1) 
those procedures are consistent with federal law and the Rules of Civil 
Procedure; and (2) the violating party had ‘actual notice’ of the rule.”).  
101
 Id. at 708. 
102
 Fed.Appx. 165, 165 (9th Cir. 2003) (unpublished). 
103
 Id. 
104
 Id. 
105
 The Ninth Circuit had previously found that the sanctioning authority 
associated with violations of local rules derives from both inherent and 
congressional authority.  See Zambrano v. City of Tustin, 885 F.2d 1473, 1479 
(9th Cir. 1989). 
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B. Procedural Interpretation 
 
 Local rules and standing orders create differences in the 
formal rules that apply to a given case.  Properly understood, the 
overall procedural package consists not just of federal rules, but 
also of local rules and standing orders,106 and each of these latter 
components may vary from district to district, or from court to 
court.  But actual differences in the formal procedural requirements 
are not the only source of procedural variation.  Disuniformity may 
also result from differences in the interpretation and application of 
uniform rules.  Put differently, federal rules are like statutes, 
regulations, and constitutional provisions; they are often 
ambiguous, and courts must resolve that ambiguity through 
interpretation.   
Part of the Supreme Court’s self-definition of its role in the 
federal system is to resolve interpretive ambiguities,107 and the 
extent of disuniformity attributable to ambiguity is thus tempered 
by Supreme Court intervention and clarification.  But the Court has 
certainly not resolved every ambiguity in the federal rules, and 
variations in interpretations persist.  For example, the work-
product protection in Rule 26(b)(3) shields from discovery many 
documents prepared “in anticipation of litigation.”108  Although 
this protection is not new, and can be directly traced to Supreme 
Court action,109 the Court has never resolved the meaning of the 
“in anticipation of litigation” requirement.  Left to their own 
devices, the circuits have developed competing tests, one requiring 
that a document be “prepared or obtained because of the prospect 
of litigation,”110 and the other requiring that a document be 
prepared “primarily or exclusively to assist in litigation.”111 
                                                          
106
 And arguably also orders issued pursuant to the court’s inherent authority, 
see infra Part III.D. 
107
 See Frost, supra note 13. 
108
 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3).   
109
 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947). 
110
 United States v. Adlman, 134 F.3d 1194 (2d Cir. 1998). 
111
 United States v. El Paso Co., 682 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1981).  For an extended 
discussion of these competing tests, see Claudine Pease-Wingenter, Prophetic or 
Misguided?: The Fifth Circuit’s (Increasingly) Unpopular Approach to the 
Work Product Doctrine, 29 REV. LITIG. 121 (2009) (complaining that the 
“because of” standard results in “an abbreviated scope” of work-product 
protection in the Fifth Circuit). There are numerous other examples of 
competing rule interpretations that have gone unresolved by the Supreme Court.  
For a sampling, see Kirin K. Gill, Comment, Depose and Expose: The Scope of 
Authorized Deposition Changes Under Rule 30(e), 41 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 357 
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Moreover, even where the Court has attempted to impose a 
uniform interpretation, disuniformity often remains because the 
Court’s rulings are themselves subject to variable interpretation.  
The evolving meaning of Rule 8(a)(2), which requires that a 
complaint include “a short and plain statement of the claim,” 
presents a recent illustration along these lines.  The classic 
interpretation of that language in Conley v. Gibson emphasized that 
the pleading requirements under the rules are rooted in notice and 
perform only a very weak screening for legal sufficiency.112  In 
response to perceptions of frivolous lawsuits and caseload 
pressures, some appellate courts began to read the language of 
Rule 8(a)(2) to raise the pleading bar and require facts beyond 
those that would provide notice.113  In two cases a decade apart, the 
Supreme Court emphasized that the plain language of the rules 
                                                                                                                                  
(2007) (discussing competing approaches to the meaning of “changes in form or 
substance” under Rule 30(e)); Natashi Dasani, Note, Class Actions and the 
Interpretation of Monetary Damages Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23(B)(2), 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 165, 197 (2006) (describing a circuit split in the 
interpretation of the Advisory Committee’s note regarding the availability of 
monetary damages in class actions certified under Rule 23(b)(2)); Daniel R. 
Fine, Comment, Defining the Appellate Universe: Does FRCP 52(b) Iimpose a 
Duty on Litigants?, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1633 (2008) (comparing approaches to 
whether a Rule 52(b) motion is required to preserve appeal of inadequate 
findings by a district judge). 
112
 Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) (emphasizing that a motion to 
dismiss for failure to state a claim should be granted on legal insufficiency 
grounds only when “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set 
of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief”).  
113
 See, e.g., Arnold v. Board of Educ. Of Escambia County Ala., 880 F.2d 305, 
309-10 (11th Cir. 1989) (“{I]n an effort to eliminate nonmeritorious claims on 
the pleadings and to protect public officials from protracted litigation involving 
specious claims we, and other courts, have tightened the application of Rule 8 to 
§ 1983 cases.”).  Either that, or they interpreted Rule 9(b) to permit a court to 
impose “heightened pleading” beyond the two claims specifically mentioned.  
The history of resistance to the “notice pleading” standard created by Rule 
8(a)(2) actually goes back much further.  See, e.g., Judicial Conference of the 
Judges of the Ninth Circuit, Claim or Cause of Action:  A Discussion on the 
Need for Amendment of Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 13 
F.R.D. 253 (1952); Baim & Blank, Inc. v. Warren-Connelly Co., 19 F.R.D. 108, 
109 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (imposing a heightened pleading standard for antitrust 
claims).  The Supreme Court’s decision in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 
(1957), quieted that resistance to some extent, but not entirely.  See Valley v. 
Maule, 297 F. Supp. 958, 960 (imposing heightened pleading for civil rights 
claims); see also Christopher M. Fairman, The Myth of Notice Pleading, 45 
ARIZ. L. REV. 987, 988 (2003) (describing the widespread practice by federal 
courts of imposing heightened pleading standards “in direct contravention of 
notice pleading doctrine”). 
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permit heightened pleading only for claims of fraud or mistake, 
and reaffirmed the Conley standard for all remaining claims.114  
That the Court felt the need to take and decide a second case on the 
same basic issue suggests that its initial effort failed to settle the 
interpretive instability that prompted the intervention.  In 2007, the 
Court disrupted whatever stability it had secured in its prior efforts 
by revisiting the pleading question yet again, this time to undo 
much of what Conley had settled fifty years earlier and insert in its 
place a “plausibility” standard that is far from self-defining.115  
Most recently, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Court reaffirmed its 
commitment to the plausibility regime, confirmed the application 
of that regime to all federal civil cases,116 and characterized the 
determination of what constitutes plausibility as “a context-specific 
task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 
experience and common sense.”117  The first two of these arguably 
improve the clarity of pleading standards; the third all but assures 
that interpretive differences will linger in the lower courts 
indefinitely.118 
                                                          
114
 Leatherman v. Tarrant County, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993); Swierkiewicz v. 
Sorema, 534 U.S. 506, 512-14 (2002). 
115
 See A. Benjamin Spencer, Plausibility Pleading, 49 B.C. L. REV. 431 (2008); 
Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How Motions to Dismiss Become 
(Disguised) Summary Judgments, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 61 (2007).  
Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89 (2007), which the Court decided just weeks 
after Twombly, further exacerbated the uncertainty because it seemed to reaffirm 
the pre-Twombly notice pleading standard.  Add cites here.   
     Of course, it is questionable how much disruption Twombly actually created 
because it is unclear whether interpretive stability ever existed with respect to 
Rule 8(a)(2).  See Posner article (suggesting that courts never really believed the 
Conley language).   
116
 Except those covered by alternative pleading regimes, such as Rule 9(b) or 
the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act.  See generally Christopher M. 
Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REV. 551 (2002) (comparing 
judicially imposed pleading standards with the heightened statutory pleading 
requirements in the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act and the Y2K Act); 
Jeffrey A. Parness et al., The Substantive Elements in the New Special Pleading 
Laws, 78 NEB. L. REV.  412 (1999) (reviewing statutory pleading standards).   
117
 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.__, _,  129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009).   
118
 See Nicholas Tymoczko, Note, Between the Possible and the Probable: 
Defining the Plausibility Standard After Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 94 Minn. L. Rev. 505, 520-26 (2009) (describing how 
difference circuits have interpreted the Iqbal standard); Scott Dodson, New 
Pleading, New Discovery, 109 Mich. L. Rev. __, _ n.41 (comparing critics’ 
varying definitions of what constitutes a “conclusory” allegation to satisfy the 
“New Pleading” standard).  See also Edward A Hartnett, Taming Twombly, 
Even After Iqbal, 158 U. Pa. L. Rev. 473, 498-503 (2010) (noting that baseline 
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C. Procedural Discretion   
 
 A third source of procedural disuniformity is discretion 
provided by the rules themselves.119  Many procedural rules 
establish fixed requirements that do not permit of  discretion; rules 
establishing time limitations are examples.120  But many other rules 
operate much differently, and instead direct the court to exercise 
case-specific discretion.121  To the extent that different judges 
exercise the discretion afforded them under the rules differently, 
the result stemming from rule-based discretion will be 
disuniformity in the procedures actually applied in a given case.122  
In other words, uniform rules do not necessarily guarantee uniform 
procedures, even in the absence of interpretive ambiguity. 
                                                                                                                                  
assumptions and judge’s experiences must inherently factor into determinations 
of plausibility); Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: The 
Motion to Dismiss Under Iqbal and Twombly, 14  Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 15 
(2010) (arguing that the pleading standard after Iqbal makes the motion to 
dismiss equivalent in standard (and possibly in effect) to a motion for summary 
judgment).  
 In part because of the disuniformity and lack of stability generated by 
judicial interpretations of federal rules, Catherine Struve has criticized judicial 
assertions of broad interpretive authority in the context of the federal rules.  See 
generally Catherine Struve, The Paradox of Delegation:  Interpreting the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1099, 1119 (2002) 
(criticizing broad interpretive authority in the context of federal rules).  
According to Professor Struve, the rulemaking process implies that courts 
should approach interpretation narrowly. 
119
 Interpretation might also be viewed as a form of discretion provided by the 
rules.  See Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural 
Discretion, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1961, 1970 (2007) (referring to “interpretive 
discretion,” and arguing that some rules may be “purposefully written in vague 
language precisely so trial judges could adapt them to the circumstances of 
specific cases”).  But for purposes of clarity, I treat the two distinctly, and refer 
here only to explicit delegations of discretionary authority contained within the 
rules. 
120
 FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b) (specifying 10 days after a jury verdict as the time limit 
for renewing a motion for judgment as a matter of law); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 
6(a) (explaining how to measure a 10 day limitation); Rule 6(b)(2) (removing 
judicial authority to extend the 10 day limit under Rule 50(b)). But many rules 
establishing time limits may themselves be subject to judicial discretion.  See 
FED. R. CIV. P. 6(b) (generally permitting the court to extend time “for good 
cause”). 
121
 Subrin, How Equity Conquered the Common Law, supra note 14, at 923 n.76 
(identifying 36 distinct federal rules that explicitly delegate case-specific 
discretion).  Indeed, rules fitting this description may be rules by name only.   
122
 See generally id. at 982-85 (arguing for stricter rules to reduce discretion and 
promote procedural consistency). 
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 Without question, the most discussed area of procedural 
discretion in recent years has been the case management authority 
provided by Rule 16.123  The received wisdom regarding Rule 16 
suggests that the 1983 amendments created space for judges to 
become much more aggressive during pretrial case management.124  
What that account misses is that judges were already exercising 
significant discretion under the pre-amendment version of the rule, 
so much so that the “metamorphosis was virtually a fait 
accompli.”125  What led to the rise of managerial judging was not a 
formal change in Rule 16, but a change in the willingness of courts 
to exercise the authority they already possessed.126  This is not to 
say that the 1983 amendments were meaningless,127 but they 
certainly did not introduce the concept of judicial discretion to the 
area of case management.   
 The discretion provided in the current version of Rule 16 is 
also entirely consistent with the original design of the federal 
                                                          
123
 See generally, Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374 
(1982) [hereinafter Resnik, Managerial Judges]; Shapiro, supra note 20. 
124
 See Robert B. McKay, Rule 16 and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 63 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 818, 823 (1988) (“Rule 16 was amended in 1983 to make 
specific what had probably been intended from the beginning – that the trial 
judge was indeed the ruler, not only of the pretrial conference, but of the entire 
pretrial process.”); Mary Kay Kane, Of Carrots and Sticks: Evaluating the Role 
of the Class Action Lawyer, 66 TEX. L. REV. 385, 407 n. 130 (1987) (“The focus 
on pretrial management is reflected in the total revision of rule 16 in 1983 
providing specific authority for early judicial control of case scheduling”).  The 
amendments to Rule 16 did more than just “create space,” of course; they also 
required early judicial involvement in all cases (subject to categorical exclusions 
created by district courts).  By adding a requirement of judicial involvement, the 
amendments to Rule 16 signaled that judges not only had authority to manage 
cases, but were expected to use it.  See Marcus, supra note 1, at 1588 
(“Beginning in 1983, Rule 16 was amended to require case management activity 
by all judges in most cases, and to encourage more managerial activity than was 
required”) (emphasis added); Kent Sinclair & Patrick Hanes, Summary 
Judgment: A Proposal for Procedure Reform in the Core Motion Context, 36 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1633, 1647 (1995).  
125
 Shapiro, supra note 20, at 1992.  
126
 A variety of factors contributed to this, from increasing caseload pressures to 
changes in how and when cases were assigned to judges.  For full accounts of 
the managerial judging story, see, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, Managerial Judging 
and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 306 (1986); Robert F. 
Peckham, The Federal Judge as a Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding a 
Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CAL. L. REV. 770 (1981); Resnik, 
Managerial Judges, supra note 123. 
127
 For a discussion of the actual changes wrought by the 1983 amendments, see 
Shapiro, supra note 20, at 1984-87. 
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rules,128 which contemplated case-based discretion exercised by 
judges from their very inception.129  Roscoe Pound, whose 1906 
speech at the American Bar Association is often credited with 
triggering the American procedural revolution,130 was a “lifelong 
proponent of judicial discretion.”131  Charles Clark, who served as 
the chief drafter of the rules thirty years later, felt similarly.132  
Reflecting those influences, the 1938 set of federal rules had an 
equitable orientation,133 and authorized the exercise of judicial 
discretion at several points.  For example, from the beginning, 
Rule 15 has instructed judges to permit amendments to pleadings 
“when justice so requires”134 and Rule 42 has permitted – but not 
required – judges to consolidate or sever issues for trial.135  
Understood in this context, the story of Rule 16 – and of other 
areas of increased discretion in federal procedural practice136 – is 
one of adjustment rather than one of invention.   
                                                          
128
 See Stephen N. Subrin, Charles E. Clark and His Procedural Outlook: The 
Disciplined Champion of Undisciplined Rules, in JUDGE CHARLES EDWARD 
CLARK 115, 116 (Peninah Petruck ed., 1991) [hereinafter Subrin, Charles E. 
Clark] (“[R]ecent procedural reforms that grant judges additional power to 
shape and control litigation are consonant with Clark’s outlook.”). 
129
 Judith Resnik, Changing Practices, Changing Rules: Judicial and 
Congressional Rulemaking on Civil Juries, Civil Justice, and Civil Judging, 49 
ALA. L. REV. 133, 201 (1997) (noting that the original federal rules were 
“founded on judicial discretion”). 
130
 Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the 
Administration of Justice, 29 A.B.A. REP. 395 (1906). 
131
 Marcus, supra note 51, at 1576; see also Subrin, How Equity Conquered 
Common Law, supra note 14, at 944-48 (recounting Pound’s efforts to promote 
judicial discretion).  
132
 See Subrin, Charles E. Clark, supra note 128 (“At the heart of Clark’s 
procedural outlook was his support of non-defining (what we now call “open-
textured”) procedural rules; a corollary was his belief that judges should be 
gratned broad discretion to interpret those rules. Clark distrusted lawyers and 
trusted judges.”). 
133
 See Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law, supra note 14, at 922 
(“The underlying philosophy of, and procedural choices embodied in, the 
Federal Rules were almost universally drawn from equity rather than common 
law.”); Marcus, supra note 51, at 1563 (“[The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] 
draw their essence more from the relaxed and discretionary background of 
equity than the confining orientation of the common law.”). 
134
 FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a). 
135
 FED. R. CIV. P. 42.  Another example of the longstanding commitment to 
judicial discretion in connection with the federal rules is Rule 1.  See Patrick 
Johnston, Problems in Raising Prayers to the Level of Rule:  The Example of 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1, 75 B.U. L. Rev. 1325 (1995). 
136
 In other contexts, the exercise of judicial discretion is arguably cabined by 
the existence of specific factors that must be considered.  Examples along these 
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  Of course, adjustments can be meaningful, too, and many 
academic commentators have complained that the recent trend has 
been to increase discretion to undesirable levels.137  To the extent 
that procedural discretion has indeed been expanding, it may be 
attributable to the increased involvement of judges in the 
rulemaking process.138  But a precise account of that trend is not 
                                                                                                                                  
lines include Rules 19(b) and 23(b)(3).  See Bone, supra note 119, at 1969.  But 
in practice, factors impose a small to non-existent restraint on the exercise of 
discretion because they tend to be “very general and frequently just repeat what 
any sensible judge would consider anyway.” Id.   
Another important chapter in the recent story of procedural discretion is 
Rule 11.   The 1983 amendment to Rule 11 was designed to strengthen the rule, 
and that was accomplished in part by removing judicial discretion.  Marcus, 
supra note 51, at 1595 n.137 (noting that “[r]ule 11 expressly mandates the 
imposition of sanctions once a violation is found”).  But the experiment with a 
“no discretion rule” led to persistent criticism, see Stephen B. Burbank, The 
Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The Example of Rule 11, 137 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1925 (1989), and lasted only ten years.  In 1993, the rule was 
amended once more to restore judicial discretion to impose sanctions.  See 
Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 146 F.R.D. 401, 507 (1993) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the revisions would “render the Rule 
toothless”).   
But procedural discretion stories do not always end with increased 
discretion, and the experience with local opt-outs under Rule 26(a)’s automatic 
disclosure provisions may provide a counter-example.   When introduced in 
1993, Rule 26(a) permitted local courts to choose not to require automatic 
disclosures, but in 2000, the rule was amended to remove the discretion to opt 
out, and was done so in order “to establish a nationally uniform practice.”  FED. 
R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note (2000 Amendment).  See also Richard 
Marcus, Reform Through Rulemaking?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 901, 915 (2002) 
(describing opposition to the 2000 amendments from federal judges). 
137
 See, e.g., Maureen Armour, Rethinking Judicial Discretion: Sanctions and 
the Conundrum of the Close Case, 50 SMU L. REV. 493 (1997); Todd D. 
Peterson, Restoring Structural Checks on Judicial Power in the Era of 
Managerial Judging, 29 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 41 (1995); Stephen C. Yeazell, The 
Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 631; 
Edward Brunet, The Triumph of Efficiency and Discretion Over Competing 
Complex Litigation Policies, 10 REV. LITIG. 273 (1991); Bone, supra note 119, 
at 1969. 
138
 See Bone, supra note 119,  at 1974 (“[J]udges have come to dominate 
membership on the Civil Rules Advisory Committee in recent years and judges 
tend to favor broad discretion.”); see also Jonathan R. Macey, Judicial 
Preferences, Public Choice, and the Rules of Procedure, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 627 
(1994) (using public choice analysis that assumes that judges will seek to 
enhance their latitude as a way of serving their self-interest); but see Janet 
Cooper Alexander, Judges’ Self-Interest and Procedural Rules:  Comment on 
Macey, 33 J. LEGAL STUD. 647 (1994) (resisting the self-interest assumption). 
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essential here.  What is clear is that judicial discretion now has a 
major role to play in procedure,139 and it was ever thus.140   
 
D. Inherent Authority 
 
 Beyond rules and standing orders, judges may also govern 
the behavior of litigants and parties during the course of litigation 
through the exercise of inherent authority.  Inherent authority 
describes “incidental actions that federal judges take without a 
specific statutory grant as needed to exercise their primary ‘judicial 
power’ of deciding cases.”141 As that description suggests, the 
source of inherent authority is different from the more formal 
procedural mechanisms discussed thus far, both of which can be 
traced to statute.142  Despite the fact that neither statute nor rule 
directly authorizes it, the exercise of inherent power nevertheless 
has a long judicial pedigree, justified “by general references to 
Article III, traditional equitable or common law practices, 
efficiency, prudence, or separation of powers.”143  
 Although inherent authority operates outside of the formal 
rules, it is not boundless, and its legitimate exercise is generally 
                                                          
139
 See Stephen Yeazell, Judging Rules, Ruling Judges, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 229, 240 (1998) (“At virtually every state of the process… the Rules 
grant judges enormous discretion in the conduct and resolution of disputes.”). 
140
 Marcus, supra note 51, at 1615 (“Taken in big picture terms, then, the 
Federal Rules construct has survived, and the current gravitation toward 
increased discretion does not threaten to dislodge it in a serious way.”); Shapiro, 
supra note 20 at 1994 (“The history of Rule 16 … suggests both the inevitability 
and the desirability of significant discretion in areas such as pretrial 
management.”). 
141
 Robert Pushaw, Inherent Powers of Federal Courts, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735, 
738 n. 4 (2001); see also Daniel Meador, Inherent Judicial Authority in the 
Conduct of Civil Litigation, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1805, 1805 (1995) (defining the 
term as “the authority of a trial court . . . to control and direct the conduct of 
civil litigation without any express authorization in a constitution, statute, or 
written rule of court”).  
142
 Local rules are authorized directly by 28 U.S.C. § 2071(a), and are further 
authorized by FED. R. CIV. P. 83.  Standing orders lack direct statutory authority, 
but are authorized by Rule 83 and therefore may claim indirect statutory 
authority through 28 U.S.C. § 2072.  As discussed above,  the power to impose 
sanctions for violations of local rules and standing orders has been viewed by 
some courts to stem from inherent authority rather than from the rules 
themselves.  See, supra text accompanying note 32. See, e.g., U.S. v. Brown, 
Fed.Appx. 165, 165 (9th Cir. 2003) (unpublished) (defining inherent authority as 
the source of power to sanction noncompliance with standing orders). 
143
 See Pushaw, supra note 141, at 739; see also id. at 760-82 (extensively 
reviewing and criticizing these justifications). 
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limited to certain recognized areas.  In the civil context, the most 
relevant domain for inherent authority is the management of 
litigation and control of case dispositions.144  But within that 
domain, the scope of a court’s inherent authority is quite broad; 
judicial recognition of authority to control litigation predates the 
introduction of the federal rules,145 and the rules have therefore 
been interpreted as being written against the backdrop of inherent 
power.146  As a result, courts have approved the use of inherent 
authority even in circumstances that appear to be inconsistent with 
the more formal requirements of the federal rules.  For example, 
the Supreme Court cited inherent authority to approve a sua sponte 
dismissal of a case for failure to prosecute, even though Rule 41 by 
its clear terms refers only to dismissals upon motion by the 
defendant.147 More recently, an en banc Seventh Circuit considered 
whether a district judge can require a represented party to attend a 
settlement conference.148  Rule 16(a) authorizes a judge to order 
“the attorneys and any unrepresented parties to appear,”149 and the 
traditional negative implication from that specification would 
suggest that represented may not be compelled to attend.  Even so, 
                                                          
144
 This includes the related ability to impose sanctions for failure to comply 
with orders designed to facilitate case management.  See Pushaw, supra note 
141, at 764-79.  An unrelated area where inherent authority has been regularly 
invoked – “supervising the administration of criminal justice” – is not relevant 
for present purposes.  Id. at 738, 779-82. 
145
 See, e.g., Landis v. N. Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936) (recognizing “the 
power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its 
docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants”). 
146
 See Heileman v. Joseph Oat Brewing Co., 871 F.2d 648, 653 (7th Cir. 1989) 
(en banc) (“[T]he inherent power of a district judge - derived from the very 
nature and existence of his judicial office - is the broad field over which the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are applied. Inherent authority remains the 
means by which district judges deal with circumstances not proscribed or 
specifically addressed by rule or statute. . . .”); Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 
626, 630-32 (1962) (“The authority of a court to dismiss sua sponte for lack of 
prosecution has generally been considered an ‘inherent power,’ governed not by 
rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their 
own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.”); 
Lumberman’s Mut. Cas. Co. v. Wright, 322 F.2d 759, 764 (5th Cir. 1963) (“One 
of the shaping purposes of the Federal Rules [of Civil Procedure] is to bring 
about uniformity in the federal courts by getting away from local rules. This is 
especially true of matters which relate to the administration of legal proceedings, 
an area in which federal courts have traditionally exerted strong inherent power, 
completely aside from the powers Congress expressly conferred in the Rules.”). 
147
 Link, 370 U.S. 626 (1962). 
148
 Heileman, 871 F.2d 648 (1989). 
149
 FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a). 
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the court approved the judge’s order, citing inherent authority to 
fill in the “gap” left by the rule.150   
 In sum, courts can issue orders and impose sanctions under 
the guise of inherent authority, and the exercise is relatively 
unchecked.  From time to time, the Supreme Court has 
acknowledged that “inherent powers are shielded from direct 
democratic controls” and has urged “restraint and discretion.”151  
But in practice, efforts to challenge the exercise of inherent powers 
are tricky, both because parties may rightfully worry about 
provoking sanctions or judicial ill will,152 and because challenges 
are reviewed on appeal under the very forgiving “abuse of 
discretion” standard.153  Thus, at the extreme, inherent authority 
permits the district judge to act as “a local chancellor,”154 and the 
written rules – whether federal, local, or standing orders – do not 
adequately define the body of procedures applicable in a given 
case.  Orders entered under the guise of the court’s inherent 
authority are part of the overall procedural package, and variations 
in practice with respect to that authority will contribute to 
procedural disuniformity across cases. 
 
E. Procedural Common Law 
 
 A final form of procedural disuniformity stems from areas 
not reached by the rules, but governed instead by procedural 
                                                          
150
 Heileman, 871 F.2d at 652-53.  For a discussion - and criticism - of how 
courts strategically create gaps in procedural rules to justify the use of inherent 
power, see Samuel P. Jordan, Situating Inherent Power Within a Rules Regime, 
__ DENV. U. L. R. ___ (forthcoming 2010).   
151
 Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980).  In the domain of 
sanctions, courts have been somewhat more aggressive about monitoring the 
exercise of inherent authority, and have generally required that a district judge 
make a finding of bad faith before imposing sanctions on that basis.  See, e.g., 
Ross v. City of Waukegan, 5 F.3d 1084, 1090 (7th Cir. 1993); Mendez v. 
County of San Bernardino, 540 F.3d 1109, 1131 (9th Cir. 2008); Schlaifer 
Nance & Co., Inc. v. Estate of Warhol, 194 F.3d 323, 338 (2d Cir. 1999); Elliott 
v. Tilton, 64 F.3d 213, 217 (5th Cir. 1995).  But see Dubay v. Wells, 506 F.3d 
422, 433 (6th Cir. 2007); Hoffman v. Construction Protective Services, Inc., 541 
F.3d 1175, 1180 (9th Cir. 2008). 
152
 Resnik, supra note 123, at  374, 402, 413, 425, 430 (1982). 
153
 See Pushaw, supra note 141, at 764; Meador, supra note 130, at 1805, 1816.  
Challenges may also be difficult for the additional reason that many exercises of 
inherent authority may occur off the record, and may therefore be essentially 
unreviewable.  See Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 123, at 411-13, 424-
31.   
154
 Carrington, supra note 75, at 943. 
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common law.  Examples here include preclusion, abstention, and 
forum non conveniens.  These relatively broad swaths of the 
procedural landscape have never been subject to formal 
rulemaking, but instead are governed by judicially-created 
doctrines.  That initial feature is shared with inherent authority of 
the sort described just above; both exist completely outside of the 
rules themselves.155 Indeed, Amy Coney Barrett has suggested that 
the similarities between the two are much greater, and that inherent 
power may be viewed as a partial source of the judicial authority to 
develop procedural common.156  But even if there is some overlap 
in authority, it is useful to distinguish procedural common law 
from the exercises of inherent power discussed above.  The 
primary functional distinction between the two involves the latter 
feature of procedural common law: it is subject to normal doctrinal 
development, and courts understand their role as creating a 
prospective and generally applicable set of common law rules.157 
Inherent power, by contrast, is often used to justify the imposition 
of case-specific procedural requirements.158   
 
IV.   RETHINKING TRANS-TERRITORIALITY –  
AND REFRAMING LOCAL RULES 
 
 Widening the lens on territorial variation ultimately leads to 
a richer understanding of trans-territoriality as a procedural value, 
and of the function of local rules within our procedural system.  
Trans-territoriality may be an aspirational goal, but it is not one 
that is realistically attainable.  There will always be variations in 
procedural requirements that are sensitive to location.  Moreover, 
the forms of territorial variation are numerous and overlapping, 
such that the use of one can often substitute for another.  All of this 
                                                          
155
  Inherent power and procedural common law are also similar in the sense that 
they may be constrained - at least up to a point - by the introduction of formal 
rules or statutes.  See Amy Coney Barrett, Procedural Common Law, 94 VA. L. 
REV. 813, 842-46 (2008). 
156
 Id. at 842-46.  But she does not conclude that inherent power is the only 
source of that authority; rather, “federal courts can exercise a common law 
authority over procedure analogous to their common law authority over 
substance.” Id. at 883. 
157
 Laurens Walker, The Other Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 25 REV. LITIG. 
79 (2006); Bone, supra note 119, at 1967 n. 17. 
158
 Put differently, the procedural requirements discussed in Part III.D are 
examples of inherent power being used “in the weak sense.”  Stephen B. 
Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power: The Role of Congress, 79 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1677, 1686 (2004). 
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suggests that the question debate about local rules should be 
reframed.  It is not a question simply of whether to permit 
territorial variation in any absolute sense, but whether to permit a 
certain form of territorial variation.  The answer to that question 
turns on whether local rules have features that are desirable relative 
to other forms of territorial variation they may displace.   
 
A. Inevitability and Exchangeability 
 
 Trans-territoriality is achievable if it requires nothing more 
than formal uniformity in the language of the written rules that are 
applied throughout the federal system.  Viewed this way, local 
rules are problematic because they contribute to formal and 
explicit differences in written rules.  Of the competing forms of 
territorial variation discussed in Part III, however, only standing 
orders raise similar concerns.159  Interpretations and exercises of 
discretion occur within the rules, but do not affect their formal 
language.  Uses of inherent power and the creation of procedural 
common law are even less worrisome because they fall outside the 
domain of the written rules altogether.  Thus, local rules emerge as 
the primary - and perhaps the only - deviation from the trans-
territorial ideal, and the argument for their elimination appears 
straightforward and compelling:  remove local rules, and the 
promise of trans-territoriality is fulfilled. 
 Unfortunately, this thin conception of trans-territoriality is 
inconsistent with the ends that the pursuit of trans-territorial 
procedure are intended to serve.160  Most obviously, a focus on the 
language of written rules serves only a very formalistic notion of 
equality.  To further a more robust interest in equality, what is 
required is enough procedural consistency to ensure that similar 
cases are treated equally.161  Superficial uniformity is therefore 
insufficient, and the proper emphasis should instead be on the 
actual procedural requirements that are imposed. Given that 
emphasis, any source of territorial variation raises concerns.  
Formal uniformity also fails to meaningfully promote the 
nationalization of legal practice.  A fixed set of rules means that 
lawyers need only memorize one set of words and numbers, but it 
                                                          
159
 And given the formalistic nature of this conception of trans-territoriality, 
even standing orders might be distinguished from local rules on the grounds that 
only the latter are denoted as “rules.”   
160
 See supra Part I.B. 
161
 See supra note __. 
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does not put them in a position to enter a federal courtroom in an 
unfamiliar district without having “to rely heavily on the wisdom 
of local practitioners.”162  Again, a practicing lawyer is ultimately 
concerned with the actual procedural requirements that may be 
imposed, which requires more than a mere understanding of what 
the written rules say.  In short, the value of trans-territoriality 
suggests  something more than a formal uniformity of written 
rules.  And given a more robust conception, local rules look much 
less like an outlier.  To the contrary, each of the forms of variation 
discussed in Part III represent deviations from the trans-territorial 
ideal.163   
 Of course, it should also be clear that trans-territoriality in 
this robust sense will always be aspirational rather than actual.  It 
is not practical to create a procedural regime that imposes 
procedural requirements that are not sensitive to the location of the 
suit.  Rather, the creation of a set of procedural rules that apply 
across the federal system will inevitably involve territorial 
variation in one form or another.  Local rules should therefore be 
viewed as one potential component of an inevitable mix of 
territorial variation.  So situated, the question of whether they 
should be retained - and in what role - becomes more complex.  It 
is not enough simply to ask whether they disrupt territorial 
uniformity, for at some level of course they do.  Instead, the 
appropriate question is whether a procedural regime that permits 
local rules produces a better mix of territorial variation than one 
that does not.   
 Reframing the question in this way does not necessarily 
entail a different conclusion.  Even if trans-territoriality cannot be 
fully achieved, it still might support an effort to root out deviations 
                                                          
162
 Shapiro, supra note 20, at 1474.   
163
 To be sure, some of the forms discussed in Part III are not “territorial” in 
precisely the same way as local rules.  Local rules create procedural differences 
that apply throughout a federal judicial district; thus, the relevant territory is 
defined along district lines.  The territorial divisions associated with competing 
forms are occasionally broader.  For example, when an appellate court has 
interpreted a rule in a particular way, the relevant territory is demarcated by 
circuit lines.  More often, the divisions are narrower.  When an individual judge 
chooses how to exercise procedural discretion, or whether to supplement the 
formal rules with a procedural requirement justified by inherent power, the 
relevant territory is limited to the individual courtroom.  Despite these 
distinctions in the physical scope of the variation, each of the forms discussed 
contribute to differences in procedural requirements that are attributable to the 
location of the suit, and each therefore undermines the goal of uniformity 
embodied by the value of trans-territoriality. 
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wherever possible.  Some competing forms - such as 
interpretation164 and the exercise of inherent power165 - may be 
impossible to eliminate, but local rules may remain an attractive 
target that would reduce the total amount of territorial variation in 
the procedural system.  What this misses is that the forms of 
territorial variation are interrelated and transposable, at least to 
some extent.  That is, the introduction of a local rule can often 
serve to displace a competing form of territorial variation.  Many 
local rules define requirements that might otherwise be imposed 
through a standing order or an exercise of inherent power, while 
others channel the exercise of judicial discretion or fix meaning 
that might otherwise be selected through interpretation.  In short, 
local rules do not exist in a vacuum, and their presence or absence 
will have ancillary effects on the overall level and composition of 
territorial variation in the procedural system.166  A proper 
understanding of their desirability and function thus requires a 
consideration of the way that they interact with - and compare to - 
competing forms of territorial variation.  The next section engages 
in such a comparison, and concludes that local rules have some 
significant advantages that should lead to acceptance of, and 
perhaps even enthusiasm for, their role in the procedural 
framework. 
   
B. A Comparative Assessment of Local Rules 
 
 When compared with competing forms of territorial 
variation, local rules emerge as desirable along several dimensions.  
They are transparent, which - contrary to common understanding - 
means that they facilitate national practice.  They involve 
                                                          
164
 Even Professor Struve concedes that some judicial interpretation will 
necessarily accompany the introduction and application of a set of procedural 
rules.  See Struve, supra note 118, at 1102. 
165
 Commentators and courts have long suggested that the legislative power to 
limit inherent power is limited, although uncertainty remains about the precise 
scope of the limitation.  See, e.g., Burbank, Procedure, Politics and Power, 
supra note 158, at 1688. 
166
 Although local rules can substitute for other forms of territorial variation, 
they will not always do so.  Therefore, the availability of local rules as a form of 
territorial variation may generate some overall increase in the level of 
disuniformity within the federal system.  But that does not necessarily mean that 
we should seek to eliminate local rules.  Ultimately, we should be concerned not 
just about the amount of territorial disuniformity, but also about its quality.  
Consideration of the overall mix of territorial variation in a system that permits 
local rules may lead us to tolerate the former to enhance the latter. 
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significant levels of participation and input from judges, but also 
from non-judicial actors.  And they apply uniformly throughout a 
judicial district and across time, which promotes a desirable form 
of equal treatment among cases.   
 
1. Transparency and Nationalization 
 
 Local rules are transparent in the sense that they are visible 
and easily discoverable.  This is not altogether surprising, given 
that many of the recent amendments to Rule 83 have been 
explicitly designed to facilitate those qualities.  For example, the 
current version of Rule 83(a)(1) requires district courts to 
“conform to any uniform numbering system prescribed by the 
Judicial Conference of the United States.”167  Thus, local rules now 
track the numbering of the federal rules, which makes it easy for 
lawyers familiar with the latter to locate counterparts in the former.  
This task is made even simpler by the fact that local rules are now 
posted on court websites, often in a searchable format.168  As a 
result, a lawyer interested in discovering local rules relating to 
summary judgment in a particular district can do so either by 
looking at Local Rule 56 or by performing a basic search of the 
local rules.   Local rules are also transparent in the sense that 
they are defined in advance.  They are promulgated according to a 
set process,169 become enforceable on a set date, and are generally 
not applied retroactively.170  This means that they, like the federal 
                                                          
167
 FED. R. CIV. P. 83.  Prior to this requirement, district courts used a variety of 
competing numbering systems for local rules, which made it difficult to find and 
compare local rules.  See STANDING COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., REPORT ON LOCAL RULES 17 
(Feb. 1, 2004), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/ 
Final_Local_Rules_Report_March_%202004.pdf. 
168
 In some districts, the court website includes a search function.  See, e.g., 
Northern District of Illinois, http://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/home/ 
LocalRules.aspx?rtab=localrule.  In other districts, there is no search function, 
but the rules are available as a downloadable document that can be searched.  
See, e.g., District of Montana, http://www.mtd.uscourts.gov/rules.htm 
(providing a downloadable .pdf of the court’s rules).   
169
 See supra notes __ and accompanying text.  
170
 FED. R. CIV. P. 83(a)(1) (“A local rule takes effect on the date specified by 
the district court and remains in effect unless amended by the court or abrogated 
by the judicial council of the circuit.”).  See also Wash. Mobilization Comm. v. 
Cullinane, 400 F. Supp. 186, 190 n.2 (D.D.C. 1975) (finding that a local rule 
relating to requirements for class certification promulgated after the filing of the 
complaint would not apply retroactively to class certification determination) 
rev'd in part on other grounds by 566 F.2d 107 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Boring v. 
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rules themselves, represent a set of procedural requirements that 
are not only discoverable, but discoverable prior to any interaction 
with the court.171  
 Most competing forms of territorial variation are relatively 
less transparent.  Standing orders basically track local rules in the 
sense that they are available on court websites and are pre-defined, 
but they need not conform to any particular organizational 
structure, which at the margins makes them more difficult to 
navigate.172  If the governing appellate court has interpreted a 
particular rule provision, then that interpretation is like a local rule 
in the sense that it is discoverable and knowable in advance, 
although the method of discovery takes a different form.  In the 
event that there is no binding interpretation by the appellate court, 
the diligent lawyer’s next move would be to research 
interpretations at the district court level, either by the presiding 
judge or her colleagues.  But these earlier interpretations are 
merely predictive,173 and for that reason they are not discoverable 
                                                                                                                                  
Medusa Portland Cement Co., 63 F.R.D. 78, 80 (M.D.Pa. 1974) (“Our local 
rules . . . have no retroactive effect.”); In re: Estate of Marstellar, No. 03 MA 
185, 2004 WL 2659253 at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004) (finding that the probate 
court could not retroactively apply a newly promulgated local rule reducing the 
amount of litigation fees and attorney expenses awarded) (citing In re: Estate of 
Covington, No. 03 MA 98, 2004 WL 1534126 at *2-3 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004)). 
171
 Of course, there are downsides to pre-definition.  Relative to some other 
forms of territorial variation such as discretion and inherent authority, local rules 
are more inflexible precisely because they involve pre-definition of procedural 
requirements rather than the development of requirements within the context of 
specific cases.  So to the extent we prefer specific and contextual requirements, 
we may prefer to eschew local rules in favor of those other forms.  Indeed, the 
choice to embed a discretionary standard within a generally applicable federal 
rule may reflect a conclusion that contextual judgment is needed.  This suggests 
that we should not expect local rules to be capable of displacing other forms that 
permit contextual decision-making.  But short of total displacement, there is still 
room for local rules to eliminate or narrow discretion in some instances, such as 
when the selection of a discretionary standard reflects a failure to reach a 
national consensus on a more fixed rule.   
172
 FED. R. CIV. P. 83(b) specifies that standing orders may not be enforced 
absent “actual notice” in advance to the alleged violator.  This requirement 
might be strictly enforced to ensure that non-uniform numbering or organization 
will not disadvantage lawyers and parties, but in practice the internet publication 
of a judge’s standing orders in toto has been viewed to satisfy the requirement of 
actual notice.  See supra note 101 and accompanying text.  
173
 This is true even of prior interpretations by the same district judge.  A district 
judge who has interpreted a rule in a particular way in a previous case may be 
likely to adopt the same interpretation again, but that result is not compelled 
because traditional stare decisis principles do not apply to district judges.  Amy 
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in the  same way that local rules and binding interpretations are.  
Moreover, the task of compiling and reconciling competing 
interpretations by multiple district judges is not nearly as 
straightforward as the identification of a governing local rule.  
Areas governed by procedural common law function similarly to 
interpretation; in the absence of a binding appellate decision, 
lawyers will rely on uncertain predictions based on prior decisions 
at the district court level.   
 Areas governed by discretion and inherent authority are 
less transparent still.  Although the discretionary standard may be 
knowable in advance, the way that any given judge will choose to 
implement that discretion is much more difficult to ascertain.  
Again, prior opinions may help, but their predictive value is 
arguably weaker because of the context-specific nature of 
discretionary decisions.  A larger problem is that most exercises of 
discretion will not find their way into a published opinion at all, 
and so the informational cue provided by prior cases will be 
incomplete.174  Instead, the best predictive source with respect to 
discretion-based procedural requirements is prior experience with 
the judge.  Lawyers seeking to know how the broad authority 
provided under Rule 16 will be exercised are likely to ask other 
lawyers who have experience practicing before the judge.  As for 
inherent authority, it is used less frequently (and perhaps less 
predictably or consistently) and so the available predictive 
information is even more limited.  Thus, while it is true that 
procedural requirements are transparent in the sense that they 
cannot generally be enforced without first being made explicit, it is 
also true that lawyers and parties will be hard pressed to know 
what those requirements might be at the outset of the case.   
 All of this turns one of the traditional arguments against 
local rules on its head.  Critics of local rules have long argued that 
local rules discourage the nationalization of legal practice, and are 
therefore in tension with one of the original goals of trans-
                                                                                                                                  
Coney Barrett, Stare Decisis and Due Process, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1011, 1015, 
1070 (2003); see also Midlock v. Apple Vacations West, Inc., 406 F.3d 453, 
457-58 (7th Cir. 2005); Threadgill v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 928 
F.2d 1366, 1371 (3rd Cir. 1991). 
174
 This point applies in the intepretive context, too.  Not all interpretations will 
be reduced to a formal opinion, although perhaps actions based on interpretation 
are relatively more likely to trigger a written explanation than those based on 
discretion. 
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territorial procedure.175  The basis for that complaint is that non-
local counsel are burdened by the need to discover and master 
local rules.  But regardless of whether local rules are permitted, a 
lawyer must familiarize herself with the local legal culture to 
practice effectively in a new geographic district (or even in front of 
a new judge within the same district).  In practice, local rules may 
serve to level the playing field by formalizing that local legal 
culture and presenting it in a visible way.  Put differently, if local 
rulemaking authority is removed, territorial variation will not 
disappear, but will become embedded in less visible forms, and the 
disadvantage presented to the outsider will be exacerbated rather 
than relieved.       
 
2. Participation and Quality 
 
 Local rules also involve input from non-judicial actors.  
Again, this is the result of intentional changes to the local 
rulemaking process that have been designed to enhance 
participation rights.  To begin, the current version of Rule 83 
requires a period for notice and comment before local rules are 
promulgated, which gives an avenue for participation to anyone 
who might be affected by a proposed rule change.176  Moreover, 
many recent developments in local rules have their roots in the 
Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, which requires the creation of an 
advisory committee which consists of a mix of judges and others 
“who must live with the civil justice system on a regular basis.”177  
Taken together, these process reforms mean that local rules now 
reflect the input of non-judicial actors both at the stage of initial 
drafting, and at the stage of post-drafting consideration. 
 Admittedly, these participation rights remain weak.  Non-
judicial actors have no final role in the rulemaking process; the 
ultimate decision about whether adopt a local rule remains firmly 
in the hands of the district judges themselves.178 In other words, 
                                                          
175
 For a discussion of the nationalizing goal of trans-territoriality, see supra Part 
I.B.1. 
176
 FED. R. CIV. P. 83.  This requirement is of fairly new vintage, and was 
introduced to address concerns about the insulated nature of the local 
rulemaking process.  See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text. 
177
 S. Rep. No. 101-416, at 414 (statement of Sen. Biden).   
178
 And another potential form of participation in the process - appellate 
challenge of the rules actually adopted - has been generally resisted by the 
appellate courts. See Flanders, supra note 10, at 217-18 (describing the failure of 
appellate courts to monitor and enforce statutory limitations on the proper scope 
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non-judicial actors are granted a voice in the process, but denied a 
vote.  Moreover, the rights that exist are imperfect.  Although 
anyone may participate in the notice and comment process, in 
practice the voices raised are likely to be local.  Consequently, the 
input generated may be skewed, and the resulting rules may favor 
local interests.179      
 But even if limited and imperfect, these participation rights 
distinguish local rules from competing forms of territorial 
variation.  Standing orders, for example, involve no formal 
participation rights other than the standard right to appeal.180  As 
for the remaining forms of territorial variation, the ability of non-
judicial actors to participate is generally limited to participation in 
the litigation process itself.  That is, a lawyer involved in a 
particular case may have an opportunity to argue on behalf of his 
preferred interpretation, or on behalf of her preferred exercise of 
discretion, and that argument may contribute to the development of 
the procedural rules imposed in the case.181  But this case-specific 
participation is different in kind from the ability to contribute to 
the development of generally applicable rules that the local 
rulemaking process provides, especially since the number of 
participants in that latter process is potentially much greater and 
more diverse. 
 
3. Scope and Equality 
 
 The scope of local rules differs from the scope of 
competing forms of territorial variation in two respects.  First, the 
territorial scope of local rules is not the same as competing forms.  
Local rules apply throughout a federal district.  Standing orders, as 
well as exercises of discretion and inherent power, operate more 
narrowly at the level of the individual district judge.  Rule 
                                                                                                                                  
of local rules).  Even if appellate courts were more aggressive, however, they 
would be authorized to act only when an adopted rule is inconsistent with the 
rulemaking authority provided by Rule 83.  In other words, the appellate courts 
could not impose a competing local rule on the basis of preference alone. 
179
 See supra text accompanying notes 80.  But of course, the presence of local 
input, even if disproportionate to non-local input, does not guarantee that the 
resulting rules will be skewed.   
180
 See supra text accompanying notes 93-97 (describing the process for 
promulgating standing orders). 
181
 And even this form of participation is not guaranteed.  A court need not ask 
for input from lawyers before interpreting a rule or exercising rule-based 
discretion.     
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interpretations may operate at that level, too, although they can 
also be broader, as when the Supreme Court or the appellate court 
has issued an interpretation.  The territorial scope of procedural 
common law may also range from the district level to the national 
level, depending on the status of doctrinal development.  Second, 
the temporal scope of local rules is not the same as competing 
forms.  Once promulgated, local rules apply prospectively to all 
cases, at least until amended.  They share this stability with 
standing orders, appellate interpretations, and some procedural 
common law.  But other competing forms are less stable.  
Interpretations made by district judges are governed by law of the 
case principles, but do not have any precedential value that extends 
beyond the judgment.  Exercises of discretion and inherent power 
are similar; a district judge may exercise discretion to impose a 
procedural requirement in one case, and then decline to impose 
that requirement in the next case, even if the two cases are similar.   
 These differences in scope have effects in terms of how 
similar cases are treated.  The notions of equality embedded in the 
design of our procedural system demand that similar cases reach 
similar outcomes, and this demand for equality is sensitive to both 
territory and time. Because they apply to every case throughout a 
federal district, local rules have the salutary effect of making the 
procedural requirements imposed by judges within that district 
more consistent.  And because they are stable unless formally 
amended through an established process, they also make those 
requirements more consistent over time.  In some circumstances, a 
different form of territorial variation may better promote equality, 
but local rules offer a mix of territorial and temporal consistency 
that is relatively attractive.   
 Of course, local rules do not serve the equality interest 
perfectly.  Variations in procedural requirements will undoubtedly 
remain even in a regime that permits local rules, and variations in 
the treatment of similar cases may therefore result.  But because 
these variations track district lines, they may be more acceptable 
than other variations which appear much more random.  Put 
differently, differences in outcomes based on the district where the 
case is filed may be less damaging to our intuitions of fairness than 
differences in outcomes based on the judge within a district to 
whom a case is assigned.    
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CONCLUSION 
 The essence of the traditional complaint about local rules is 
that they create geographic variations in the federal system, and 
that those variations undermine the procedural value of trans-
territoriality.  Procedural uniformity is good; local rules disrupt 
uniformity; therefore, local rules must go.  This argument is 
facially attractive, but ultimately unconvincing.  It views local 
rules as an outlier, as an obstacle to the fulfillment of an ideal.  But 
in practice, territorial variations in procedural requirements are 
common and inevitable, and the sources of those variations are 
numerous and transposable.  If we broaden the lens on territorial 
variation, the debate about local rules looks much different.  The 
choice is not between two procedural systems, one with territorial 
variation and one without.  It is between two profiles of territorial 
variation, one that includes local rules and one that does not.   
 
